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Date

2/11/76

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

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or POST

FILE No. NBR 10/1 (Part A)

TITLE: ARMS SALES FROM UK TO IRAQ

REFER TO

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NAME
(and dept. when necessary)

TO
SEE:

DATE

NAME
(and dept. when necessary)

TO
SEE:

DATE


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FILE No. NBR 10/1 PART A



British Embassy
Tehran

Good!

Enter submit.

①

B2/1

REC-1

64-11-1000

NBR10/11

Your reference

G S Burton
MED
FCO

Our reference 10/8

Date 31 December 1973

Dear Graham,

POSSIBLE SALE OF HOVERCRAFT TO IRAQ NBR10/5 (37) 1973

1. Thank you for your letter of 13 December.
2. The Ambassador took the opportunity of his farewell audience with the Shah to raise this question. The Ambassador said that, in line with the frankness which now characterised our exchanges, he would like to have his reactions to this. Iraq had, of course, quite an important economic potential for Britain, and if we turned down such a request, our commercial presence there might be prejudiced, not to mention the prospect of resuming diplomatic relations (about which the Shah and the Ambassador had previously been speaking). In any case, if the Iraqis really wanted to fit these hovercraft with missiles, which was possible, they would probably do better by obtaining more military-type craft from Russia, like the six OSA's they already had.
3. The Shah said he saw no objection. He did not fear an Iraqi land threat of any kind; it was the TU 22s and the air missile threat to Abadan which were dangerous. He had told Kosygin that if Iraq struck at Abadan, he would hit the Iraqis with everything he had. Perhaps this had been a mistake, as it may have led the Russians to give the most sophisticated weapons to the Iraqis - some of them more sophisticated than the Egyptians had.
4. So the Shah has given the green light.

See in

H J Arbuthnott

H J Arbuthnott

cc: P G De Courcy Ireland Esq
KUWAIT

H B Walker Esq
JEDDA

I.A. on Memorials (2)
to have.

Mrs Long

Mr Hope

- separate copies

Mr Muir

Mr Raftery, MED ✓

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 14 JAN 1974 NBR10/1

DEFENCE SALES TO THE MIDDLE EAST

1. You will recall that a couple of months ago we asked the Ministry of Defence to check up-to-date lists of equipment which we have sold or agreed to sell to the following countries: Egypt, Libya, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.

2. We have now received back from DS13 in MOD their revised lists. I attach the relevant extract for countries for which you are responsible.

P M Nixon
Near East & North
Africa Department

11 January 1974

SECRET

IRAQ

A Orders completed since January 1971

1. 3 Norman Britton Islander Aircraft
2. Bomb Disposal Equipment (see section B)
3. Bomb Ejector Release Cartridges
4. 50 Tank Transporters

£1.4m

B Orders secured and delivery in train

1. Bomb Disposal Equipment (£23,440 outstanding) . £112,381

C Orders secured but deliveries not yet in train

Nil

D Equipment under negotiation or for which there are good prospects

1. Bomb Disposal Equipment £286,000

E Equipment which has been approved for direct sale but for which interest is not currently being shown

- * 1. 12-50 Sea King helicopters
- * 2. 40 Strikemaster Aircraft
- * 3. Vosper Thornycroft patrol boats.

NOTE

1. We have no knowledge of items marked * which were on the original list.

SECRET

From: P D Brittain, AD/Sales 1B

LH 384D



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ

Telex 23605

Telephone 01-236 0000

Direct line: 01-236 0000

MR Bourton: I don't see any reason for preventing the visit

RECEIVED
REGISTRY No 35

15 JAN 1974

Our reference

D/Sales/113/73/1

7th January, 1974

Peter Williams, Esq
Middle East Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Dear Williams.

I mentioned to you the other day that Hawker Siddeley would like to respond to a request from Iraq that they should send out a couple of technicians to report on the state of 10 Chipmunk aircraft. You suggested that I should drop you a line about it.

The Chipmunk is, of course, an ab initio trainer. HSA supplied 21 to the Iraqi Air Force between 1951 and 1954. The 10 we are concerned with were handed over some time ago, perhaps along with others, to an Aero Club which we understand is funded by the Government and under some form of Ministry of Defence control. Perhaps this is no more than one would expect.

HSA would like to respond to this request. It is good of them to consult us: I am sure they do not really need to; but our relations with them are of the best and it would, I think, be a helpful gesture in the difficult times if we were not to discourage the visits proposed. Doubtless they would consult us again if they came to the point of being invited to send a further team to under the refurbishment.

Yours

Smearly
P D Brittain



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

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REGISTRY No 35

15 JAN 1974

NR10/1

P D Brittain Esq
Ministry of Defence (Sales)
AD/Sales 1B
Stuart House
23/25 Soho Square
London W1V 5FJ

Your reference

Our reference

Date 11 January 1974

Handwritten: 15/1
AB pa

HAWKER SIDDELEY/CHIPMUNK AIRCRAFT

- 1 Thank you for your letter of 7 January.
- 2 I am writing to confirm that we see no objection to the proposed visit taking place.

P K Williams
Middle East Department

NBR10/1 (5)
(91974)



Folio (5) transferred
to NBR10/2

With the compliments of

MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT

6

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copy on NBR10/1

REC 1	IN
REGISTR. No 35	
21 JAN 1974	
NBR10/1	
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IMMEDIATE

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CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A
FROM KUWAIT200635Z JAN
CONFIDENTIAL

TOP

74

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 76 OF 19 JAN REPEATED FOR INFO TO
ROUTINE TEHRAN AND JEDDA
YOUR TEL 24:
HOVERCRAFT FOR IRAQ.

Mr. Brumby. We discussed.

27

1. AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM MY 170815Z JAN TO JONES , DEFENCE
SALES, WE DO AT LAST APPEAR TO HAVE INSPIRED IN GENERAL
MUBARAK'S MIND AT LEAST A BELIEF IN THE HOVERCRAFT AS THE MOST
IF NOT THE ONLY , SUITABLE , VEHICLE FOR AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE
IN THE BUBIYAN-WARBA AREA. ALL OUR ARGUMENTS WILL BE TURNED
AGAINST US IF WE NOW SELL HOVERCRAFT TO IRAQ. THE KUWAITIS
WILL NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN CIVILIAN
AND MILITARY VERSIONS. THEY WILL SEE US SUPPLYING IRAQ WITH A
WEAPON WHICH HAS NO RELEVANCE TO THE ISRAELI BATTLE, ONLY
TO THEIR OWN DISPUTE WITH IRAQ. I WOULD EXPECT THIS TO JEOPARDISE
THEIR APPARENT PLAN TO PLACE AT ANY RATE THEIR NAVAL ORDERS WITH
US SEMICOLON AND TO UNDERMINE THEIR CONFIDENCE IN KELLY IN
PARTICULAR AND KLT IN GENERAL AS ADVISERS ON THE THEIR DEFENCE
REQUIREMENTS.

2. I APPRECIATE THAT IN MANY RESPECTS IRAQ MUST BE REGARDED
AS A BETTER LONG-TERM BET THAN KUWAIT BUT IN THE SHORT TERM
I WOULD NOT CONSIDER THE RISKS OF SELLING HOVERCRAFT TO IRAQ
AS ACCEPTABLE.

3. IF NEVERTHELESS YOU FEEL UNABLE TO REFUSE A LICENCE I WOULD
PREFER YOUR COURSE B. MAKING THE APPROACH TO SHAIKH SA'AD.
IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PUT IN ALL THE TECHNICAL EVIDENCE
AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THE CONTENTION THAT THESE WERE CIVILIAN
CRAFT, AND ANY TECHNICAL OBSTACLES TO CONVERSION. I
HOPE THAT OUR APPROACH TO THE KUWAITIS COULD BE MADE SUFFICIENTLY
EARLY TO GIVE US TIME TO RECONSIDER , IF WE THOUGHT IT
DESIRABLE, IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR REACTION.

WILTON

FILES
MED
END
HENAD
MAWEIR
MR TAYLOR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 230

PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A

TOP COPY 7

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
23 JAN 1974
NBR10/1.

FM FCO 181750Z

CONFIDENTIAL

1974

TO PRIORITY KUWAIT TELNO. 024 OF 18 JANUARY/ INFO TEHRAN, JEDDA.

HOVERCRAFT FOR IRAQ: DE COURCY IRELAND'S LETTER TO BURTON 22 DEC.

1. HM AMBASSADOR, TEHRAN RAISED THIS POSSIBLE SALE WITH THE SHAH WHO SAW NO OBJECTION TO OUR CONCLUDING SUCH A DEAL. HM EMBASSY JEDDA CONSIDER THAT IT WOULD NOT CREATE ANY SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES THERE. PROVIDED THAT THERE ARE NOT INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES WITH KUWAIT WE PROPOSE THEREFORE TO RECOMMEND GRANTING BHC LICENCE.

2. BEFORE DOING SO, WE NEED TO ASSESS CAREFULLY ANY ADVERSE EFFECT TO OUR GENERAL BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH KUWAIT AND SPECIFICALLY OF OUR PROSPECTS FOR THE CONCLUSION OF OIL DEALS. IF WE AGREE TO THE SALE, WE SEE TWO POSSIBLE WAYS OF PROCEEDING:

(A) TO WAIT FOR THE KUWAITIS TO RAISE THE MATTER AND THEN STRESS TO THEM THAT THE HOVERCRAFT ARE REQUIRED FOR PURELY CIVILIAN PURPOSES AS FERRIES AND THAT THE TENDER SPECIFICATIONS SUPPORT THIS; OR

(B) TO TELL THEM IN ADVANCE THAT WE INTEND MAKING THIS SALE AND TO EXPLAIN AS IN (A).

WE WONDER, HOWEVER, IF ACTION AS IN (B) ABOVE WOULD NOT TEND TO AROUSE KUWAITI SUSPICIONS THAT THE DEAL WAS NOT AS "CLEAN" AS WE WERE CLAIMING.

3. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR FURTHER VIEWS ON POSSIBLE KUWAITI REACTIONS AND ON HOW, IF APPROVED, THE DEAL SHOULD BE PRESENTED TO THEM. BHC ARE PRESSING FOR A DECISION AND WE WOULD WELCOME A REPLY BY 21 JANUARY.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES:

MED

MR WEIR

ENERGY D

MR TAYLOR

NEN AD

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE



A F Collings Esq
Section 3
C/SB
DTI
Export House
50 Ludgate Hill
London EC4M 7HU

A/BRI hc

16 December 1973

Hovercraft for Iraq.

1. We are sending to LIS today a tender notice, No. 105/73, from the Iraqi Ports Administration for the supply of three 50 passenger and two twelve passenger hovercraft. We have sent to Basra for the tender documents, but several local agents have already got copies and have been in touch with the British Hovercraft Corporation.
2. I was about to draft an EISER telegram on the above on 12 December when I received an unexpected visit by Messrs. Robinson and Stone of the British Hovercraft Corporation, who had been invited to come to Iraq by the Iraqi Military Attaché in Brussels. The Iraqi Ministry of Defence are interested in acquiring the following:-

BHC Winchester Class Mk. 3 and 4 Version Small
BHC Winchester Class SR N6 Military (Middle)
BHC Wellington (BHT) - Big
Vosper Thornycroft FPB - Big

3. Numbers required are not known to me. We made an appointment for Robinson and Stone to see Colonel Nahi of the Iraqi Ministry of Defence, Armed and Supply Department. Next day they went to Basra to see the Iraqi Ports Authority, and I have not yet seen them back in Baghdad. They said they would call again on me before returning to the UK.
4. As the possibilities of British-made Iraqi Hovercraft operating in the Upper Gulf and the Shatt Al Arab may be of wider interest I am copying this letter to Gardiner in CRE Dept., DTI; Burton in Middle East Dept., ECO; Scott in ECGD; and the Directorate of Sales (1) Defence Sales Organisation, Ministry of Defence.

P. Donovan.



DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
ABELL HOUSE JOHN ISLIP STREET
LONDON SW1P 4LN

01-834 4422 x 376.

Our Ref: AW/59/085

9th January 1974

Mr. P. D. Brittain,
AD Sales 1B,
MOD(PE),
Stuart House, Soho Square,
LONDON W.1.

RECEIVED SALES

10 JAN 1974

Dear Mr. Brittain,

REGISTRY

CONVERSION OF CIVIL HOVERCRAFT

You have asked for advice on the resources involved in conversion of civil hovercraft of SRN6 and CC7 type to military use from the points of view of:

- a. ease of conversion
- b. time required to convert
- c. resources necessary

Obviously the answers depend upon the modification state at beginning and end of the process. No fully armed hovercraft has yet been built; LMGs are fitted to some craft. The 2 existing military CC7s for the British Army, for example, are modified relatively little from the 3 civil craft so far built; the craft are small and light, and are used as personnel carriers or reconnaissance vehicles. The main changes are the fitting of Army communications equipment and the reduction of seating on account of the greater consequent unladen weight. A more recent and hence more powerful engine was fitted, but this would now constitute the normal civil standard. No armament is fitted; if it were, it would reduce the seating still further. Overall, one could say that a civil CC7 would be no more and no less easily converted than would a fast pleasure boat. Two or three weeks work by radio fitters would cover most of the effort needed. The standard civilian CC7 is an eight seat craft. All production craft have transport joints in the hull, which enables an additional 64 inch length section to be fitted, this stretched version increases the seating to 14, with little degradation of performance. (To date no stretched version has been built.)

The SRN 6 has several military versions, one of which (the vehicle carrying SRN 6 Mk5) requires major structural modifications for which the expertise probably only exists at Cowes. Other military versions have a widened front door (which could be specified by a civil purchaser), a strengthened roof forward with gunning or observation dome, and a "soft top" through which cargo can be lowered. None of these modifications could be completed quickly; even at the factory, probably 3-4 months by a team of skilled metal workers would be needed. The result would again be a logistic or reconnaissance craft rather than a fighting vehicle.

Yours sincerely,

J. W. Leach
J. W. Leach,
Hov. B.


c.c. Wing Cdr. A.I. Alder - MD Sid.

G. BURTON Esq.



WITH COMPLIMENTS

Ivan Scott



EXPORT CREDITS GUARANTEE DEPARTMENT
P.O. BOX NO. 272, ALDERMANBURY HOUSE,
ALDERMANBURY, LONDON EC2P 2EL

From: P J James, Defence Sales Organisation
LH 384D



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ

Telex 23605

Telephone ~~01-487-0200 ext~~

Direct Line 01 632 4709

Switchboard 01 632 3333

W9

Mr G Burton

Near East and North Africa Department

Your reference

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Downing Street

London SW1

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35

30 JAN 1974

Our reference

Sales 1b/Lebanon

Date

2/ January 1974

Dear

Graham,

NBL 10/1

CONVERSION OF CIVIL HOVERCRAFT

We spoke recently about the probability of converting civil hovercraft to a military application, and I can do no better than attach a copy of a letter which has been received from the Department of Trade and Industry.

I am sure that this is the information that you require.

Yours sincerely,

Enc

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 30 JAN 1974 NBR 10/11

Mr J L Taylor

HOVERCRAFT FOR IRAQ

Flag A

1. MED intend to submit to Mr Weir shortly recommending that British Hovercraft Corporation Ltd should be given a licence to export five hovercraft to Iraq.

Flag B
Flag C

2. Jedda, Tehran and Kuwait were consulted. Jedda and Tehran reported that they could see no objection to the sale: Kuwait felt that the sale should not be approved at present. With Mr Egerton's approval we pointed out to MED our anxiety that this sale could have unfortunate consequences on our talks with the Kuwaitis on a long-term oil deal. MED agreed to put the latest position to the Ambassador in Kuwait and ask for a further assessment. The Ambassador has now replied, again recommending that the sale should not be permitted but avoiding any reference to oil. The British Hovercraft Corporation are pressing MED for a reply (I understand that the matter has been outstanding for some time) and MED intend to put up their submission without altering their recommendation.

3. Although Kuwait have not mentioned oil I still have reservations about the proposed sale. It would be difficult to stop it now; but before the Department concurs, I should be glad to know your views.



N M Fenn
Energy Department

21 January 1974

Copy to: Mr T Clark, MED

Mr Clark

I find it difficult to imagine any grounds which we could give to the Iraqis or the exporters for a refusal. I agree that if the Kuwaitis are angered and upset, this could have adverse effects

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on Kuwait's attitudes to the oil companies
+ BP in particular, + make them less
amenable to reason over price. If it were
possible, I would wish at any rate to
avoid any publicity while the participation
talks are in progress (they will of course
affect the outcome in all the Gulf states)
But for the rest I think we will have to rely
on presentation as a commercial deal to
a commercial customer for commercial purposes.
Can we avoid publicity for a while?

John

Mr. Burton

1. I suggest we hold this over to Mr. Wright's return. He will have discussed the subject in Kuwait.
2. In the meantime pl. consider Mr. Taylor's query.

J22/1

Mr Burton
Mr Williams
Mr Wright

I agree with the line proposed in para 2 of Mr Burton's minute - but think we must be careful not to promise a favourable decision only a rapid

HOVERCRAFT FOR IRAQ one.

1. By arrangement with DTI (Hovercraft Division and CRE4), I telephoned the Managing Director of British Hovercraft, Mr R Stanton-Jones, in order to establish the company's policy towards the deals for Iraq and Kuwait. Hitherto, all I had been able to learn through DTI was that British Hovercraft viewed both contracts as of equal importance.

2. Mr Stanton-Jones was in no doubt about the relative merits of the two sales prospects. Rather surprisingly, he attached priority to Kuwait, his reasons being that this customer was known to the company, a firm requirement for Hovercraft has been stated, the deal is bigger and the terms under a Government-to-Government sale present a minimum of risks. On the other hand, the Iraq proposal is fraught with difficulties for British Hovercraft; the customer is an unknown quantity and the terms of the tender are swingeing and they call for unconditional guarantees for which ECGD are unable to provide cover.

3. British Hovercraft's intention in the circumstances is to try to keep the sale with Iraq alive while continuing with Kuwait. If a Kuwait were to react adversely, they would be ready to sacrifice the Iraq sale provided Kuwait were to sign up. Mr Stanton-Jones confirmed that the Iraq tenders were due to be submitted on 6 February. British Hovercraft could not submit on the present Iraqi terms and in the absence of ECGD cover. His tactic therefore will be to present to the Iraqis a proposal set out on the general lines of the Iraqi terms but containing the standard Hovercraft terms of contract. He hopes that this will be acceptable to the Iraqis in place of a tender and that both parties can move on from there to detailed negotiations over terms. The risk involved in this tactic is that a competitor may accept the Iraqi terms and tender accordingly, in which case it would presumably get the contract. Naturally he is banking on this not happening, though he fears that the French company might be in a position to do so because the French Government are more adventurous in providing cover than ECGD. I mentioned to Mr Stanton-Jones the considerations concerning the issue of an export licence for Iraq (he is well aware of the political problem vis-a-vis Kuwait). I went over the Defence Sales suggestions for leaving the matter open until their presentation had taken place in Kuwait and added that other conditions also supported postponement of a decision. He said that it would be a disadvantage for the licence to be granted at the moment because he intended to use it as a pretext for not complying fully with the Iraqi tender specifications and also as a shield against possible Kuwait criticism. I suggested that in

the/

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the circumstances related by him it would seem to be preferable for a decision on the licence to be postponed until after the Kuwait presentation. His reaction was that the decision should be taken soon so that the company would know where it stood and also could move swiftly if the Iraqis were to respond to their offer. This would still make it possible for him to use the licence ploy with Iraq and Kuwait providing we withhold its issue until required, which would give British Hovercraft the best of both worlds, assuming of course that our decision was favourable.

P A Raftery
P A Raftery
Middle East Department

29 January 1974

1 What Mr Stanton Jones wants at the moment is not a licence in his hand but a promise from us that we would grant one at a time suitable for him. This puts us in an invidious position; we do not, as I understand it, give hypothetical decisions of this nature. I have, no doubt, however that if we tell BHC this bluntly they will ask for a licence immediately and still use the ploy of denying its existence (assuming it is granted) with the Iraqis and Kuwaitis.

2 I consider that we should continue to stall with BHC. It seems to me that the "condition-meeting" tenders will take some time to evaluate, and presumably eliminate, before the Iraqis could reasonably turn to the BHC offer. We should put this point to BHC and explain that we would prefer to postpone consideration until such time as the Iraqis indicate their wish to negotiate terms. At that time, we would do our best to give them a very rapid decision.

3 If the recipients agree to follow the action proposed in para 2 above, I also consider that it would be wise for Mr Wright to explain to the DTI (Mr Graves Smith?) the background to our decision and to reassure him that we are in no way obstructing the path of British exporters quoting, if we get it, BHC's acceptance of our position. Mr Macdonald, Defence Sales, will wish to know of BHC's views on the Kuwait sale.

G S Burton
G S Burton
Middle East Department

30 January 1974

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1. I agree to the proposed stalling tactic. The difficulty could clearly resolve itself.

30/

Mr. Glenn Smith
has been
replaced by
Mr. David Royce.

Hollis 29/

I agree. When Mr. R. J. M. has spoken to Mr. Stanton just again, I could have a word with Mr. Glenn Smith.* But it will not be a decision now (and they have for all already asked for it in this letter of 18 January) as shall have to submit.

Ph

29/

Mr. Wight.

I have explained our preference for postponing consideration to Mr. Stanton just. He accepted this course and he stated clearly his understanding that postponement could not pre-judge the decision in any way: the matter would have to be considered

on its merits in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. I added that he could be assured that there would be no delay in securing the decision once the moment came.

Mr. Stanton Jones said he was relieved that at least the request had not been turned down flatly. However, he had an additional problem: apparently Air Vice Marshall Coulthard had been in touch with his Deputy Chairman, Sir Christopher Hartley, this morning to warn him that the bag deal could prejudice relations with Iran. This worried Mr. Stanton Jones, who had sounded out the Iranians privately some time ago and had established that they would not object. I said that this coincided with our view but I would consult MOD Sales to find out more of the background. I thought that there had been no recent complications and that it was merely that MOD Sales were a little out of step with us. I will follow this up & will reassure Mr. Stanton Jones in due course.

You may now wish to contact Mr. Doyle.

I have explained the position to Mr. Doyle, who is content.

I. Hall

38/1.

11/2

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

12

RECEIVED IN REGISTER No 35 - 4 FEB 1974 NBR 10/1

R Stanton Jones Esq
Managing Director
British Hovercraft Corporation Ltd
East Cowes
Isle of Wight
PO32 6RH

Your reference

Our reference

Date 31 January 1974

As it is unlikely that I will have a chance to telephone you today, I am writing this brief letter to confirm that I have sorted out the crossed wires in Defence Sales over Iran: ?
Air Vice Marshall Coulthard has undertaken to square everything with Sir C. Hartley when he calls on Sir Lester Suffield today.

Iraq
No IRAN

I have also informed Defence Sales about your acceptance of our preference for the postponement of a decision on the export licence pending your approach to the Basra Port Authority and your understanding that this postponement did not in any way pre-judge the outcome of the decision.

P A Raftery
Middle East Department

Mr Poulton 1/2

RB 1/2

I have told Defence Sales that
it is important in this rep.
at the Kuwait demonstration
to be fully briefed about
the Hovercraft situation.

I.A. L 4 1/2

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FO 261/E 074/07

LKS NR 210/7

RR MODUK

RR FCO

GR 90

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ADVANCE COPY (1974)

MR10/1

13

Def. D (2)

~~ME~~

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[file]

Mr. Raftery

TO ROUTINE MODUK (FOR DEF SALES) TEL NO DIG/EDW/FOH 070800Z
OF 7 FEBRUARY INFO TO MODUK (DI4) AND FCO DEF DEPT.

FROM SANDERS.

HS1182 HAWK.

DURING COURSE OF MEETING AT MY REQUEST WITH IRAQ MOD YESTERDAY
LT COL AHMAD KHAIRI IAF SAID THEY WERE INTERESTED IN THIS
AIRCRAFT. AND WOULD LIKE FURTHER DETAILS.

PLEASE FORWARD LITERATURE TO INCLUDE PERFORMANCE DATA,

FUTURE AVAILABILITY, AND COST WOULD THERE BE ANY OBJECTION
TO SALE TO IRAQ? 11X

KHAIRI ASKED IF WE COULD SUPPLY THE INFORMATION WITHIN THE NEXT
TWO WEEKS

BT

Mr. Buxton

Mr. Wither

Mr. Clark

Mr. Raftery

NNNN

Mr. Wither

13/2

Slightly unusual use of the Training Aircraft by the Iraqis but in view of the interest in this we should not stand on our dignity 13/2

The HS1182 is still in the drawing board: it could be the successor to the GNAT and will be designed as a training aircraft. Though attachments for hardware will be available.

In view of the long-term nature of this inquiry, I do not think that we should give a view on X at this stage. 13/2

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BRITISH EMBASSY

KUWAIT

12 February 1974

14

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 15 FEB 1974 NBR10/1

G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
FCO

Tellyman IA. L2072 Mr. Haffey

Dear Graham,

HAWK AIRCRAFT TRAINER

1. You will have seen (my tel 34 of 8 February) that the Iraq MOD have enquired for details of the Hawker Siddeley Aircraft Trainer with a view to purchase.

2. I am writing from Kuwait to say that we are not sure how serious this interest is, but you will no doubt be considering before providing information whether or not it is in our interests to supply "arms" to Iraq. There are a few clear points in favour of doing so. We already train a few of their best pilots on our aircraft, and Iraq has some British aircraft still (Hunters). There is (presumably) very little security objection to releasing to Iraq the technology of a Trainer aircraft - though we must accept that it is available to the Russians to examine.

3. Iraq was on the list of battlefield countries embargoed from military supplies during the Middle East war. That ban has now been lifted. We have never discussed what the imposition or lifting of the ban really meant, but we assumed in Baghdad that, even with a ban, there would be little objection to the supply of defensive radar, communications equipment, softskinned vehicles, and training aids (e.g. flight simulators). A training aircraft without weapons is hardly more offensive than any of these items, and with the ban lifted I think it may be difficult to find grounds not to supply.

*not in the ban
was lifted*

he has been in the staff

Mr. Wally Head of Defence Sales has commented that he hopes we will not supply the HS trainer.

I propose to reply to 13th Mar above i.e. no.

*not to enter into any polemics regarding I McCluney
what we may or may not want to sell to Iraq.*

Anyways! Assume that this subject is known as far as the Swedes are concerned, hence McCluney's reluctance to writing in Kuwait. L14/2


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Ref: ~~Civil Aviation~~

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LA *[Signature]*
(NBR 10/1)

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RESTRICTED

TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELNO 31 OF 20 FEBRUARY 1974.

/ 13
YOUR TELEGRAM TO MODUK 070800Z FEBRUARY AND YOUR LETTER OF
12 FEBRUARY: HS1182 HAWK

1. WE SEE NO OBJECTION TO PROVIDING THIS LITERATURE AND THIS IS BEING ARRANGED.
2. WE WOULD NOT WISH TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENT ON SALES AT THIS STAGE AND SANDERS SHOULD THEREFORE AVOID DISCUSSING THE MATTER. HE COULD IF NECESSARY REFER TO THE LIMITED TERMS OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS TRAINING ATTACHE, AGREED BY THE IRAQIS. HE MAY SAY THAT THE AIRCRAFT IS NOT YET IN SERVICE AND THAT IT WILL BE SEVERAL YEARS BEFORE IT IS AVAILABLE FOR EXPORT.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES
MED
DEFENCE D
SIR G ARTHUR
MR WEIR
MR CAMPBELL

COPIES TO
D 1 4)
SALES 1) MOD

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

LH 384E




MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ

Telex 23605

Telephone 01-437-9288 ext.-
01-632 3484

16

Miss M McIntosh
Defence Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Your reference

NBR10/1

Our reference

D/Sales/113/18/1

Date

22 February 1974

Dear Miss McIntosh

ARMS WORKING PARTY CLEARANCES

We are approaching DS13b for clearance of the equipment described below. Pending their reply, could we have an indication of your Department's view to the release of this equipment please?

- 1 Country: Iraq
- 2 Description of weapons system: ZB 298
ZB 298 is a lightweight non-coherent pulsed doppler radar operating in the X-band. It is used for the detection of men and equipment on land and water, detection of helicopters and the adjustment of artillery fire. This can be done in all weather and by day or night.
- 3 Security classification of equipment: RESTRICTED
- 4 Further information: This equipment is produced by Marconi-Elliott Avionic Systems Ltd.

Yours sincerely

Cristina Lamb

C LAMB (Miss)

Copies to: Mr H R Braden - DS13
Mr G J Gammon - Treasury
Mr P T Durnell - DTI (EPB)
Lt Col C W A Napier - DPS (C team)
Mr T E Nissen - D/Sales Supply

1. MWD letter.

2. *Mr. Raftery*
MWD

May I have your comments re?

him [unclear] (EHS 26)

Letto to mo) No objection.

MWD 1/3 [unclear]

L29 ✓

MWD letter
26.2.74



RESTRICTED
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY NO 35
4 MAR 1974
NBP 10/2

(17)

MISS C LAMB
SALES 4c
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
STUART HOUSE

Your reference

Our reference NBP 10/2

Date / March 1974

NBR 10/1

Dear Miss Lamb,
ZB 298 FOR IRAN - 9

- MOD info

25/3

1. Your letter D/Sales/113/18/1 of 22 February refers.
2. There is no political objection to the supply of the ZB 298 radar system to Iran. 9
3. I am copying this letter to the other members of the Arms Working Party.

Yours sincerely,

Muirn MacGillivray

M R McIntosh (Miss)
Defence Department

RESTRICTED

1A. 25/3

CONFIDENTIAL



BRITISH EMBASSY

KUWAIT

Encl 8 1/3

18

10/20

6 March 1974

RECEIVED IN REGISTER N 35 -6 MAR 1974 MBR101

P J Raftery Esq MBE
Middle East Department
FCO

note Mr (13/3)

!A.

Dear Peter,

HOVERCRAFT FOR IRAQ

There is nothing
starting here:
the House of Commons
authorities
asked for tender
No their interest
is public knowledge

1. Commander Kelly, Naval Adviser in KLT, tells me that a German friend of his here, who has just recently returned from Baghdad, has heard about Iraqi interest in Hovercraft. The German understood that the Iraqis wanted them in connection with the Sea Island oil terminal which they plan to build.
2. Although the Kuwaitis have not said anything to us and nothing has appeared in the local press, it seems likely that this story will rapidly get about. I shall be grateful therefore if you can let me know how we stand on this sale (our telegram number 76 of 19 January refers).

Yours,
Robert

R A Kealy

Mr. Williams 3
Mr. Burrows 1/3

LA 2 1/3

The Kuwait demonstration will be over the way on 12 March and I will then speak to

CONFIDENTIAL

British Hovercraft

have one (22)
LA 2 1/3

noted B.
RW 14/3 (7/3)

See minute

7/3

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 11 MAR 1974 NBR10/4

19

FROM: I. S. McDONALD, DIRECTOR OF SALES



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

Stuart House 23-25 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ.

Telex 23805

Telephone 01-632-3470

Mr. Craig (MCD)
I have met Major Mahmood as interpreter with the British Ambassador's judgement.
Nice, kind, polite, in a way, no judgement.
6 March 1974
Mr. 1/10 have told me.
He used to say as an interesting
case as an interesting
in matters of importance
7/3

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. Craig

Yesterday a Major A. L. Mahmood telephoned me and asked very urgently if he could speak with me. He sounded rather mysterious on the telephone and at first I said that I could not manage a meeting. As you know, I am just on my way to Saudi Arabia and time is at a premium. Additionally, I do not like to meet mysterious people with mysterious commissions. Major Mahmood persisted and said that he had important questions to ask me from a Foreign Secretary. In the end I agreed to have lunch with him.

2. Major Mahmood turns out to be Iraqi born. He now assures me he has British citizenship. He also told me he works closely with the FCO in a translation capacity.

3. His purpose in meeting me was to ask what the HMG reaction would be if Iraq approached us with a request for arms. In reply I kept strictly to general points saying that of course Iraq must recognise that arms sales was a creature of politics and policies between Governments. They represented a degree of trust between the Governments concerned. Iraq at present had no diplomatic relations with HMG and even when, or if, these relations were re-established it would be realistic to look for a growth of trust rather than an immediate accretion.

4. I also said that there would of course be security considerations, particularly bearing in mind the Russian presence in Iraq.

Mr. A. J. M. Craig
Head of NENAD
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Room W75A
Downing Street (West)
London. SW1A 2AL

CONFIDENTIAL



6 March 1974

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

5. Major Mahmood took all these points and agreed with me that if there was any possibility of arms sales to Iraq it must come gradually over a period of time as confidence and trust grew between our two countries. He did not appear surprised or disappointed at this ultra-cautious reaction but said he would report it faithfully back to the Iraqi Minister of the Interior who is now seemingly in London. He also mentioned he would be accompanying this Minister to a Health Farm in England next week.

*The Minister
just left the UK
2 days after the
conversation.*

6. I was concerned throughout our talk not to commit or seem to commit HMG in any way. Indeed as you know, the prospects of any sales to Iraq raise very considerable difficulties for us in our sales relations both with Kuwait and with Iran.

Yours sincerely,

M. D. Ross

ps/D Sales 1.

(Dictated by I. S. McDonald
and signed in his absence)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REC'D IN	
REGISTRATION 35	
11 MAR 1974	
MBR10	1

Mr. Clark
Mr. Williamson
Mr. Burton
Mr. Raftery

E.H.A.

ARMS SALES FOR IRAQ

You will wish to see the attached letter from Mr. McDonald in MOD Sales to Mr. Craig about an approach from Major Mahmood. You will also wish to note Mr. Craig's comment on him.


2. It is curious that the Iraqi Minister of the Interior should choose to pass a message in this way. There was no reference to any possible arms sales during the call which Mr. Weir and I paid on General Ghaidan on 25 February. I have no doubt, however, that arms sales will become an issue once diplomatic relations have been resumed and it might be worth giving some preliminary consideration to the general lines we should follow in responding to such requests.


P.R.H. Wright
Middle East Department

8 March 1974

It is strange that the message should come in this way. We have had no other approaches about arms sales (howevercraft are something of a special case of our own creation) but I agree with Li Wright the Iraqis will doubtless raise the issue as our relations improve.

CONFIDENTIAL


"3 / Allough

Flag A

Although it is true that we have had no other specific enquiries for arms from official circles in Iraq, Major Sander's curious conversation recently at the Iraqi MOD may have been in Iraqi eyes the first step in smoothing the way for future requests.

On the line we should take with the Iraqis following any resumption of diplomatic relations, I think we could do no better than follow the example of Mr MacDonnell. Clearly the Iraqi attitude both to us and her neighbours together with the strong Russian presence there make it very difficult ^{for us} to consider any sales of any importance; I am sure even the Iraqis will appreciate this.

11/3

CONFIDENTIAL

From: P D Brittain, Assistant Director, Sales 1b

21

Room 316

W. Burtough 13/1
W. Rafferty 14/3
E.H.N. 14/12
This is alright.
12/10/3

Major J Y Sanders, RRF
Training Liaison Attache
British Interests Section
Royal Swedish Embassy
Baghdad
c/o Foreign and Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
London SW1.

D/Sales/113/V1

7th March, 1974

REC 1
REGISTER N 25
15 MAR 1974
NBR 10 1

I was most interested, and pleased, to have your letter of 18 February about your role in regard to Defence Sales opportunities in Iraq.

I wholly concur in your assessment of the developments in this field. As you infer, however, much that we can offer, and do offer elsewhere, is bound to be controversial in relation to Iraq. Any proposal to supply military equipment has to go through triple hoops of fire. If at all contentious in the political sense it has to survive possibly hostile scrutiny in Parliament; if it has security aspects these have to be considered seriously so long as there is danger that the Russians might benefit, and to our detriment; and not the least consideration, both Iran and Kuwait with both of whom we have very close diplomatic relations are most important customers for British defence equipment. We are obliged therefore to keep our profile low. This does not mean that we cannot respond to Iraqi interest: we must just be careful in how we develop our relationship with them. It can do more harm than good, all the round, to encourage expectations that have to be denied. It will be, I think, very much a matter for your judgement as to how far you go along the road with them. Obviously Jaguar is out. But we are not objecting to the Iraqis having information on the HS.1182 Hawk Trainer always provided there is no commitment to supply.

In one area, however, we can be more forthcoming. ICL have recently entertained a Brigadier Al-Azzawi and his team in UK in the hope of selling computers for logistics management. We have lent considerable support to this in affording facilities for visiting MOD establishments where ICL equipment is in use and providing presentations of the use to which it is put. We made a similar arrangement when Dr Bayati, Director General of the National Computer Centre, Baghdad, came here in December. Both visits seem to have gone very well indeed. And this brings me to a point that falls immediately within your current terms of reference. Brigadier Al-Azzawi was particularly keen to have the offer of places on UK, ideally MOD, courses for ADP training. He was given no commitment but an undertaking that it would be considered. This is now being done, and we will ask you in due course to let the Brigadier know the outcome.

/Your request

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

From: P. D. Brittain, Assistant Director, Sales

Room 316

Major J. Sanders, MR
Training Liaison Officer
British Interests Section
Royal Swedish Embassy
Baghdad
C/o Foreign and Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
London WC2R 0AR

W. P. Brittain

7th March, 1971

Your request for literature, etc, is being taken up and I hope the supply will start again before long.

I hope that we may meet at the next DA's conference.

A copy of this letter goes to Peter Williams of the Middle East Department.

Yours

P. D. Brittain

(P D BRITTAI)

In one area, however, we can be more forthcoming. I have recently contacted Brigadier Al-Azawi and his team in UK in the hope of selling computers for logistics management. We have lent considerable support to this in affording facilities for visiting MOD establishments where IOL equipment is in use and providing presentations of the use to which it is put. We made a similar arrangement when Dr. Fayyaz, Director General of the National Computer Centre, Baghdad, came here in December. Both visits seem to have gone very well indeed. And this brings me to a point that IOL was immediately within your current terms of reference. Brigadier Al-Azawi was particularly keen to have the offer of places on UK, ideally MOD, courses for IOL training. He was given no commitment but an undertaking that it would be considered. This is now being done, and we will ask you in due course to let the Brigadier know the outcome.

Your request

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED REGISTR. N. 3
21 MAR 1974
NBR 10/1

off.

22

R A Kealy Esq
British Embassy
KUWAIT

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 14 March 1974

Dear Sir,

hw in my month. noted R.

1/21/3

HOVERCRAFT FOR IRAQ

1 Your letter 10/20 of 6 March refers.

2 The short answer is that officially the position has not changed. After discussions with British Hovercraft it became clear that there was no real urgency for a decision on the Iraq sale and in some ways it suited their book, particularly in connection with the Kuwait negotiations, if we were to leave things in the air for the time being. We understand that they submitted a tender to the Iraqi Ports Administration by the deadline (6 March) since when they have heard nothing. They do not propose to display any further interest for the time being and particularly while the Kuwait prospects are looking so bright (they have intimated that if this deal is clinched they may let the Iraqi sale drop quietly).

3 So far as I know, the Iraqis have not been particularly secretive about this matter and I believe that their notices to tender went out in the normal way. We need not therefore be surprised if the topic is mentioned in business circles but for our own reasons we would not of course wish to encourage discussion about it.

Yours,

PA

P A Raftery
Middle East Department

CONFIDENTIAL

From: O. Ogun, Sales Supply 5b, Room 1144

23



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext 3631

RECEIVED IN	
REGISTRY No 35	
19 MAR 1974	
NBR 10	1

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
London, SW1.

RECEIVED IN	
REGISTRY No 37	
18 MAR 1974	
Your reference	
Our reference	D/Sales/
Date	18 March, 1974.

Dear Miss McIntosh

We have received an enquiry from the Embassy of IRAQ on behalf of Iraqi Army for several spare parts for .303" Bren Machine Guns, Mk I & II. Some of these are available from stock.

Will you please say if there is any objection to the supply of these spare parts, valued at £855 approx.

Yours sincerely,
[Signature]

Copy to:

Head of DS 13

MOD DS13b

MOD Defence Policy Staff

DTI (EPB)

Treasury (Defence Materiel Dept.)

① MED to enter

② Mr Rafferty MED
Any objections pse?

Mr Lane.

No MED objections. 12/3

John C Lane 19/3



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35

26 MAR 1974

NBR 10/1

24

O OGUN ESQ
SALES SUPPLY 5b
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 21 March 1974

LA. 126/3

Dear Ogun,
SPARE PARTS FOR IRAQ

1. Please refer to your letter D/Sales/523/10/12 of 18 March to Miss McIntosh about the supply of spare parts for .303 Bren Guns to Iraq.
2. There are no political objections to the supply of these spare parts.

I am sending a copy of this letter to recipients of yours.

Yours sincerely
C G Lane
C G LANE
Defence Department



From: O. Ogun, Sales Supply 5b, Room 1144

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext 3631

26 MAR 1974

25

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35

REC
REGIST

15 MAR 1974

Your reference

NBR101

Our reference D/Sales/
523/10/12

Date 11 March, 1974

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
SW1.

Dear Miss McIntosh,

We have received a request from the Government of IRAQ for supply to the Iraqi Army of Qty.5 25 Pdr. Gun Barrels, valued at £3,750.

Will you please say if there is any objection to this sale.

*Min the Intosh. DFTMOD
No objection. 24/3
K 24/3*

*Yours sincerely
[Signature]*

Copy to:

Head of DS 13

MOD DS 13b

MOD Defence Policy Staff

DTI (EPB)

Treasury (Defence Materiel Dept.)

I agree.

*Mr. Raftery
MEI*

*May I have
your comments?*

*No objection, I think. The
Iraqis already have the
the weapon. 24/3*

*Mr. Raftery
14.3.74.*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

(26)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 26 MAR 1974 NBR 10/1
--

O Ogun Esq
Sales Supply 5b
Ministry of Defence
St Christopher House
Southwark Street
SE1

Your reference

Our reference

Date 21 March 1974

IA R 26/3

Dear Ogun,

GUN BARRELS FOR IRAQ

1. Please refer to your letter D/Sales/523/10/12 of 11 March to Miss McIntosh about the supply of Qty 5 25 Pdr Gun Barrels to the Iraqi Army.
2. There are no political objections to their sale.
3. I am copying this letter to recipients of yours.

Yours sincerely

C G Lane

C G LANE
Defence Department

cc to: Head of DS13
MOD DS13b
MOD Defence Policy Staff
DTI (EPB)
Treasury (Defence Material
Dept

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 29 MAR 1974 NBR 10/1
--

British Attaché;
Royal Swedish Embassy, Baghdad,
British Interests Section.

27

Directorate of Sales (1),
Ministry of Defence (PB),
Stuart House,
23/25 Soho Square,
London W1U5FJ.

On to in MED
Mr Raftery. 128/3.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 27 26 MAR 1974
--

10/7
16th March 1974

HS1182 Hawk Trainer Aircraft

Reference:

A. My signal EDW/FOH 070800Z Feb

B. FCO signal No. 31 201540Z Feb

1. At a meeting at Iraq MOD yesterday with the Director of Air Training for the Iraqi Air Force Group Captain Khalid Sarah this subject was raised again.

2. Gp. Captain Khalie Sarah stated:

a. They are very interested in this aircraft.

b. They would want a minimum order of 30 aircraft.

c. Air Colonel (Gp. Capt.) Kahtan Azzawi called into Hawker Siddley in London the other day and collected more detail on the aircraft.

d. They realised there was no hope of delivery before 1977/78.

3. I followed the instructions outlined in Ref.B Nevertheless they still want to know.

a. Likely price

b. Earliest delivery date

4. Gp. Captain Khalid Sarah is arriving in UK around the 20 March. He is attending a PSO Course at RAF Biggin Hill from 25 March - 5 April and could well be pursuing this matter with Hawker Siddley.

Very:
Mr Williams

Mr Bruckner 28/3

I think we can take this slowly.

R24

Sanders J.Y.
Major
Training Liason Attache

Copy to:

FCO Defence Dept.
King Charles Street,
London SW1.

From: O. Ogun, Sales Supply 5b, Room 1144



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext 3631

Butler MGD

28

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department
Downing Street,
London, SW1

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 27
2 APR 1974

Your reference

Our reference D/Sales/
523/10/12
Date 2nd April, 1974.

8 APR 1974

NBR10/1

Dear Miss McIntosh,

We have received an enquiry from the Government of IRAQ for the supply of various 5.5 and 25 Pdr. gun spares to the Iraqi Army. These spares will be provided from Army stock.

Will you please say if there is any objection to the sale of the spares, valued at £8,500, to Iraq.

Wait another two weeks

Mr Raftery

I also think it should be delayed.

Yours sincerely,
[Signature]

Copy to:

Head of DS 13

MOD DS 13b

MOD Defence Policy Staff

DTI (EPB)

Treasury (Defence Materiel Dept.)

Sales 1b

PR8/4

in memo
8/4

Mr. Williams 8/4

Mr Raftery

(220) refs

This is only a minor sale. Any objections please?
but I suggest that we should delay now that the ME arms sales plan is in the offing
Colin Langley 3/4

U/VJ

LH 384D



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ

Telex 23805

Telephone 01-427-9288 ext

Direct Line: 01-632-3484

Switchboard: 01-632-3333

Wait another two weeks noted

Enter Med

29

Miss M McIntosh
Defence Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON SW1

Wait another two weeks.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY N 27
5 APR 1974 IN
REGISTRY N 35
8 APR 1974

Your reference

bw in the

Our reference

D/Sales/113/18/1

Date

3rd. April 1974

Dear Miss McIntosh

NBR10/1

Wait another two weeks

Could we please have an indication of your Departments view to the release of the equipment described below:-

1 Country - Iraq

no informed

2 Description of Weapons System - 101" Land Rovers and one ton trailers.

the same. 24. 4. 74

3 Security classification of Equipment - Unclassified.

an ME Arms Sales policy division

4 Further Information - The Land Rovers are produced by BLMC. The quantity required is 800-1000.

I am copying this letter to members of the AWP.

Yours sincerely

Mr Raftery.

Christine Lamb.

C LAMB (MISS)

BLMC have been discussing these items with Iraqi officials for some months now. I believe

Copies to: Mr H R Braden DS 13

an Iraqi General is in the UK at the moment & has

Mr M Esau DS 13

Mr G J Gammon Treasury

Mr P T Durnell DTI (EPB)

Lt Col C W A Napier DPS (C Team)

I have 25/4/74

been given a demonstration at Larkhill.

Any objections? Colin Lane 8/4

CONFIDENTIAL

From: P D Brittain, Assistant Director, Sales 1b

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 23 APR 1974 NBR10/1

Direct Line 01 632 4707
Switchboard 01 632 3333

30
Mr. Brittain - 6 sec
18/4

Major Y Sanders
Training Liaison Officer
British Interests Section
Royal Swedish Embassy
BAGHDAD
c/o Foreign & Commonwealth Office King Charles Street
SW1

D/Sales/113/73/1

10 April 1974

Dear

You wrote on 16 March (your 10/7) about Iraqi interest in the Hawk Trainer Aircraft.

Colonel Sarab and Colonel Lufta are here. I have not seen them but I am told that they enquired, as you said they would, about availability of Hawk and, as it happens, Jaguar. They are being told that commitments to the RAF and to existing customers place any expectations for new orders so far into the future that there is little practical basis for discussion at the present time. Of course, the situation may change. If I see this happening I will give you early warning.

I have not met these officers, but I had a pleasant encounter with General Agha a few weeks ago when he was entertained by the London Chamber of Commerce. He was here on business connected with the civil engineering aspects of the new Barracks complex at Kirkuk.

General Jenab is here, of course, in connexion with a possible order for the commercial type Land Rover. We can only wait and see what happens on that one. The order could be substantial: BLMC are well aware of that. But there may be one or two hoops to go through before an order is landed.

A copy of this letter goes to Peter Williams MED.

Yours sincerely

P. Brittain

discussed with Mr. Brittain: he will let us know
if the handsome negotiations should harden.
At the moment they are fairly tentative.

N.B. I have since cleared an E.L.A.W. Ex-PA.
The export of 500-1000 handwoven to Iraq.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 180500Z

CONFIDENTIAL

MOD DISTRIBUTION

31

Med.

TO ROUTINE MODUK ARMY TEL NO DIG EDW 180500Z OF 18 APRIL.

FOR DEFENCE SALES 1B FROM SANDERS
ICL COMPUTERS TO IRAQ.

YOUR D/SALES /113/1/1 OF 21 MARCH REFERS.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO 35 24 APR 1974 MBR10/1

ONE. AT MEETING WITH DUNCANSON OF ICL TODAY FOLLOWING
POINTS WERE RAISED.

TWO. ICL CONTRACT ABOUT TO BE SIGNED AND THEIR TRG
PROGRAMME NOW ARRANGED.

THREE. DUNCANSON RECOMMENDS FOLLOWING COURSE OF ACTION FOR
OUR ASSISTANCE

ALPHA. SHORT TERM. TWO SYSTEMS COURSES APPLICATION ORIENTED
OF APPROX 4 WEEKS DURATION STARTING AT BEGINNING OF AUGUST.
IAF TO STUDY RAF LOGISTIC SYSTEM AND IRAQ ARMY TO STUDY
ARMY PERSONNEL AND PAY ROL STATISTICS.

BRAVE. LONG TERM A SERIES OF BACKGROUND AND PRACTICAL
COURSES DESIGNED TO TRAIN A NUCLEUS OF IRAQI PERSONNEL
OVER A PERIOD OF TWO WEEKS.

GOUR. I WILL BE IN LONDON 22-26 APRIL SUGGEST I COLLECT
FROM YOU LIST OF AVAILABLE COURSES AND SYLLABI AND RETURN
WITH IT TO DISCUSS WITH DUNCANSON AND REPS FROM IAF AND
IRAQ ARMY BEST COURSE OF ACTION FOLLOWED BY FIRM BIDS FOR
COURSES.

FIVE. IT WAS SUGGESTED BY DUNCANSON THAT YOU SHOULD BE
ASKED AGAIN POSSIBILITY OF RAF OR ARMY FMEICER BEING
SECONDED TO IRAQ TO ASSIST IN SETTING UP SERVICES COMPUTER
SYSTEMS.

MCCLUNEY

BT



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext 3631

32

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 27 22 APR 1974	Your reference NBR 10/1
25 APR 1974	
Our reference D/Sales/ 523/10/12	
Date 19 April, 1974.	

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
SW1.

Dear Miss McIntosh,

We have received an enquiry from the Military Attache, Iraqi Embassy, Brussels, for the supply of Qty.40 Demolition Test Sets Mk.1. The items, valued at £1,112, are available from British Army stocks.

Will you please say if there is any objection to this sale.

*Yours sincerely,
Suzanne*

Copy to:

Head of DS 13

MOD DS 13b

MOD Defence Policy Staff

DTI (EPB)

Treasury (Defence Materiel Dept.)

Sales 1b

1. M&D to enter
2. Mr. Raftery

Letter to MOD

M&D 29/4

May I have your comments?

NAME) Rejuring

25/4
22.4.74



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

30 APR 1974

NBR10/1

O OGUN ESQ
SALES SUPPLY 5b
ROOM 1144
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 19 April 1974

Dear Mr. Ogun,

IRAQ

1. Thank you for your letter D/Sales 523/10/12 of 19 April.
2. There is no political objection to the supply of 40 Demolition Test sets Mk1 to Iraq.
3. I am copying this letter to the other members of the Arms Working Party.

*Yours sincerely,
Muiram McIntosh*

M R McIntosh (Miss)
Defence Department

1/2. 13074

GR 110

CONFIDENTIAL

34

CYPHER CAT A

FM TEHRAN 290800Z APR

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED REGISTRY N 555 30 APR 1974 MBR 10/1

COPY

Telegram
EPA

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 211 OF 289 APRIL RPTD FOR INFO
TO MODUK (FOR HDS).

HOVERCRAFT FOR IRAQ.

1. IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH IRAQ HAVE BEEN SUBJECT TO CONSIDERABLE STRAIN SINCE THE SHAH TOLD MY PREDECESSOR HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO THIS DEAL. WE HAVE SEEN NOTHING FURTHER ON THE SUBJECT SINCE KUWAIT TEL NO 76, BUT, IF IT IS NOT TOO LATE, YOU MAY LIKE TO LOOK AGAIN AT THE SALE IN THE LIGHT OF MY TEL NO 204. (see above 4A)
I RECOMMEND, IF YOU STILL WANT TO GO AHEAD, THAT WE OBTAIN THE SHAH'S CONFIRMATION THAT HE STILL HAS NO OBJECTION.

2. IF A LICENCE HAS ALREADY BEEN GRANTED AND CANNOT BE REVOKED, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR US HERE THAT THE DEAL SHOULD RECEIVE NO REPEAT NO PUBLICITY.

PARSONS

FILES
DEFENCE DEPT
MED
WED
PUSD
IRD
GIPD
NEWS DEPT
PS/MR ENNALS
PS/MR HATTERSLEY
SIR G ARTHUR
MR THOMSON
MOD (INT)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

GR 45

CYPHER/CAT A

FM FCO 301450Z

RECEIVED
REGISTER NO 35
1 MAY 1974
(NBR 10/1)

LA. (2/5)

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE TEHRAN TELNO. 147 OF 30 APRIL⁷⁴/INFO KUWAIT.

1. YOUR TELNO. 211 (NOT TO KUWAIT) : HOVERCRAFT FOR IRAQ.
2. NO LICENCE HAS BEEN ISSUED NOR WAS ANY DECISION TAKEN ON THE PROPOSED SALE. WE UNDERSTAND FROM BRITISH HOVERCRAFT THAT THE IRAQ PORTS AUTHORITY HAVE LOST INTEREST AND ARE NOW CONSIDERING BOATS INSTEAD.
3. WE SHALL OF COURSE CONSULT YOU SHOULD THE IRAQIS RENEW THEIR INTEREST.

CALLAGHAN

FILES
MED
MR WEIR

COPIES TO
HDS MOD

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ UK EYES A

Discussion with Kamal Adham 16 April 1974.

Egypt

He told me that he had recently seen President Sadat who had expressed some anxiety about the slow pace of the negotiations with British firms for the support of Egypt's defence industry. He stated that all the necessary decisions had been taken between Egypt and Saudi Arabia regarding the manufacture of the Hawk (HS1182) in Egypt. He said that the proposal would be worth about £120M and that it was expected that some 200 aircraft would be ordered initially for Arab countries.

I asked him about the position of Ashraf Marawan and he indicated that he still had President Sadat's confidence.

He expressed pleasure at the forthcoming Lynx demonstration in Egypt which he expected the RSAF would attend. He said there were doubts in Egypt whether Helwan could cope with the "production" of Lynx as well as the Hawk and he believed it might well be necessary for new facilities to be constructed for the Lynx production line.

He asked me to speak to Westlands because it was being alleged in Egypt that contrary to Egyptian wishes Westlands were employing agents, namely Mr Dennis Walters MP and El Gindi. I gathered that El Gindi's wife had approached the President's wife and this had made Sadat very angry (Note: I subsequently spoke to Mr Speechley of Westlands who denied that they were employing agents for their Egyptian business. Evidently they had had an "arrangement" with El Gindi some years ago and he was now trying to get a commission on the helicopter deal that had been financed by the Saudis - but all that Westlands had offered was a small ex-gratia payment (which El Gindi had refused as being insufficient) which would not be charged against the contract).

Abu Dhabi

Kamal said that he thought the Rapier deal would be concluded successfully and he offered to help in that area. He thought that Abu Dhabi might well be in the market for aircraft shortly since she intended to transfer her Mirages to Egypt. The French were being very active and were offering the F1.

Kuwait

He thought the chances of our selling Chieftain and Rapier were good although the US and the French were putting on aggressive sales campaigns.

Iraq

His view was that the present Iraqi Government was faced with serious problems. They were finding that the Kurds were, in some areas, better equipped than the Government forces. It was likely therefore that the country would be in disarray for some time.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ UK EYES A

36

FO 043/E 057/13

LKS NR 825/13

PP MODUK ARMY

GRS 50

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 130555Z MAY 1974.

R E S T R I C T E D

TO PRIORITY MODUK ARMY TEL OF 13 MAY 1974.

DIG EDW.
FOR DEF SALES 1B.
FROM SANDERS.

HAWK HS 1182 TRAINER.

FAILED TO COLLECT APPROX COST AND EARLIEST DELIVERY
DATES FROM HS OR YOURSELVES. CAN YOU SUPPLY INFO FOR
ME TO PASS ON AT NEXT MEETING WITH IAF WITHOUT COMMITMENTGM

REC 1 D IN REGISTRATION No 35 13 MAY 1974 NR R10/1

MOD DISTRIBUTION

MED

Encl H.A.

(13/5)

DONOVAN
BT

NNNN

Pour un montant total de 750 millions de francs

La France prévoit de livrer à plusieurs pays

des missiles, des mortiers et des équipements laser ou infrarouges

La France a accepté de vendre l'équivalent de 750 millions de francs au total des matériels terrestres aux forces armées d'une douzaine de pays du Proche-Orient. Ces ventes tous azimuts ont un caractère particulier qu'elles concernent pour l'essentiel, des missiles sol-sol et des équipements de précision du tir (laser ou infrarouge) adaptés à des blindés, des hélicoptères de combat, le premier rang des fournisseurs, et notamment la Société nationale industrielle aéronautique (SNIAS), la Société française de matériels d'armement (SOFMA) et la société Thomson-Brandt, qui ont négocié des contrats avec le Koweït, les Émirats d'Abu-Dhabi et de Qatar, le golfe Persique, la Libye, l'Irak et l'Arabie Saoudite. Sur tous ces accords, il a été prévu que serait appliquée la clause de non-réexportation, c'est-à-dire qu'aucun des clients étrangers ne pourra revendre à un tiers les matériels acquis, sans l'autorisation de la France.

ainsi que des missiles S.S.-11 Harpon, à courte portée, seront livrés au Koweït (40 millions de francs), à Abu-Dhabi (77 millions), à l'Arabie Saoudite (90 millions) et à l'Irak (90 millions) : pour plus de 300 millions au total. Ces engins équipés, le premier, d'une manette de tir manuelle et, le second, d'une télécommande infrarouge. Ces missiles sol-sol sont destinés à détruire ou à endommager des objectifs fixes ou mobiles, terrestres ou marins, protégés ou non,

à des distances inférieures à 3 kilomètres, selon des calculs de leur constructeur, la SNIAS. Dans le cas du Koweït, comme dans celui de l'Arabie Saoudite et de l'Irak, ces engins S.S.-11 ou Harpon seraient installés à bord d'automitrailleuses légères ou de véhicules tous terrains Panhard. En revanche, la principauté d'Abu-Dhabi envisage de monter ces engins sur des hélicoptères Alouette III ou sur des jeeps Land Rover.

La France fournira aussi à Abu-Dhabi deux millions de cartouches calibre 7,62 Nato, des amorces pour des projectiles de 155 millimètres, des pièces détachées pour canon de 20 millimètres et des installations spéciales pour le tir de missiles air-sol AS-37 anti-radar à partir des avions supersoniques d'appui tactique Mirage-5 déjà achetés au groupe Dassault-Breguet.

La Libye s'est portée acquéreur, pour un montant global de 95 millions de francs, de soixante-dix mortiers de 120 millimètres et d'environ soixante mille projectiles explosifs, fumigènes ou éclairants. Ces mortiers sont montés sur roues et ils peuvent tirer à raison de dix coups à la minute, à des distances de 8 à 15 kilomètres. Selon son constructeur, la société privée Thomson-Brandt, les performances de ce mortier sont égales à celles d'un canon d'artillerie, mais il est plus léger et mobile. Tout indique, selon des spécialistes, que les Libyens pourraient se servir de ces mortiers

— largables par avion — pour l'appui direct à des forces parachutées en terrain accidenté.

Ce sont des mortiers très différents, de 60 millimètres, que l'Irak recevra de la France pour un coût total de 137 millions de francs. La transaction porte sur un millier de ces mortiers à percussion commandée ou automatique et plus de cinq cent cinquante mille projectiles explosifs, fumigènes ou éclairants. Ces armements sont destinés, selon toute probabilité, à un appui rapide d'unités d'infanterie ou de commandos engagés dans des combats de rue ou des combats courts et violents à des distances très rapprochées. De surcroît, l'Irak achètera environ soixante mille cartouches à haut pouvoir explosif et, pour 52 millions de francs, près de cinquante mille cartouches de 90 millimètres à obus charge creuse, explosifs ou fumigènes, destinées à ses automitrailleuses légères Panhard.

Un artifice administratif

L'Irak prévoit aussi d'installer sur une quarantaine d'hélicoptères Alouette-III, achetés à cette occasion, des canons de 20 millimètres accompagnés de quatre cent mille munitions (soit 18 millions de francs). L'équipement de ces hélicoptères en fait, quoi que puisse en dire le gouvernement français, de redoutables plates-formes de tir et de mitraillage dans des missions offensives, mais il est vrai que, pour justifier cette transaction, le fournisseur peut faire valoir — par un artifice de procédure administrative — que l'Irak ne figure pas dans la liste des pays du Proche-Orient soumis à un embargo... Enfin, les autorités irakiennes ont demandé au représentant de la Société française de matériels d'armement (SOFMA), en mission récente à Bagdad, que leur soient livrés, pour un montant de 31 millions de francs, cent cinquante équipements laser montés sur des automitrailleuses légères Panhard et capables de repérer un objectif à 10 kilomètres.

Des télémètres identiques seront vendus au Liban, qui a choisi, en outre, des armes collectives légères antichars de conception française pour équiper ses unités d'infanterie et de commandos. Ces armes ALO-APX-80 à charge creuse sont parachutables. Elles peuvent être portées par un seul combattant ou montées sur des véhicules terrestres, et elles atteignent des cibles distantes de 500 à 1 000 mètres. Enfin, le Liban va acquérir plus de cent trente-trois mille amorces de projectiles pour mortiers de 81 et 120 millimètres, et des discussions continuent pour la vente de mines antichars à haut pouvoir de destruction : ces engins, dont le déclenchement est assuré par un allumeur

anti
Kurdish
use?

Je suis sûr
qu'il
Kurdish
use!

Randpa,
French Arms supplies to Iraq.
R2 3/5

pas à la Fédération des émirats arabes du golfe Persique, s'apprête à conclure avec la France et le Brésil un accord tripartite au terme duquel elle recevra des véhicules blindés Cascavel, de conception brésilienne, sur lesquels seront montées des tourelles françaises avec un canon de 90 millimètres. Pour un montant de 95 millions de francs, dont un peu moins du tiers en acompte dès la signature de la commande, la France livrera les tourelles, des équipements complets infrarouges pour le tir de nuit et des jumelles infrarouges qui permettent d'observer et de conduire la nuit.

Au reste, des équipements identiques — en particulier, des épiscopes passifs, des jumelles infrarouges et des détecteurs d'alerte de sources infrarouges et impulsions laser pour la conduite de nuit, sans phares, des chars de combat sont proposés actuellement tant au Qatar qu'à plusieurs autres pays du Proche-Orient (Abou-Dhabi, Arabie Saoudite, Bahreïn, Koweït et Libye) par la société française Télécommunications radio-électriques et téléphoniques (T.R.T.).

Négoziées alors que Georges Pompidou était président de la République, toutes ces ventes ou ces prospections, semble-t-il, n'ont pas été interrompues à ce jour. On assiste au Proche-Orient et dans le golfe Persique à une surenchère des fournisseurs d'armements modernes : l'Union soviétique, la Grande-Bretagne, les Etats-Unis et la France n'ont, apparemment, aucune peine à trouver des clients prêts, pour la plupart, à payer comptant. Dans le cas présent, il s'avère qu'en commandant des missiles, des mortiers et des équipements laser et infrarouges, ces pays ont tiré des enseignements de la guerre israélo-arabe qui a mis



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

Defence Sales 1b

Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ

Telex 23805

Telephone 01-632-3484

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 27
16 MAY 1974

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 35

17 MAY 1974

MBR10/1

Miss M McIntosh
Defence Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Your reference

Our reference

D/Sales/113/18/1

Date

13th May 1974

Dear Miss McIntosh

ARMS WORKING PARTY CLEARANCES

Could we have an indication of your Department's view to the release of the equipment described below please?

1 Country: Iraq

2 Artillery Ancillary Equipment:

	Qty
1 Prismatic Compass Mk 3	750
2 Protractor Artillery Board	1,000
3 Slide Rule 10" Artillery	250
4 Calculator Displacement FBA	100
5 Light Beacon Director Mk 1	400
6 Aiming Point Illuminating Device	300
7 Proportional Divider	100
8 Circular Protractor 6"	100
9 Calculating M/C (machine).	25
10 Military Protractor Mk III	1,000
11 Lighting System for Boards No 1 Mk 1	250
12 Field Clinometre	40
13 Charge Temperature Thermometer	200
14 Air Photos Interpretation Device	20
15 Projector-Overhead	35
16 Range Finder 1 metre base	50
17 Meteorological Balloons	Not known

3 Security classification of equipment: Unclassified

I am copying this letter to other members of the AWP.

Yours sincerely

C. Lamb

C LAMB

Copies to:- Mr H R Braden - DS13
Mr M Esau - DS13
Mr W P Cassell - Treasury
Mr P T Durnell - DTI (EPB)
Lt Col G W A Napier - DPS (C team)

1. n/k to enter
✓ Mr. Raftery
any objection?
It looks like a
pretty basic list of
equipment for artillery
training purposes.

MBR10/1
16. 5. 74.

No objection. 17/5
Hello to Mrs. M. Esau.

(38)

LKS NR 869/18

PP MODUK ARMY

GRS 50

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 181010Z MAY.

R E S T R I C T E D

TO PRIORITY MODUK ARMY TEL OF 18 MAY 1974.

DIG EDW.

TO A ARM 226.

FWFROM DA.

CARTRIDGES FOR HUNTER 5G A/C.

TWO IRAQI OFFICERS VISITING U.K. DUE TO LEAVE IN NEXT FEW DAYS WISH TO KNOW WHERE THEY CAN PURCHASE EIGHTY 12K/1411 CARTRIDGE EJECTOR RELEASE NO 1 MK3 FOR HUNTER A/C. ANSWER ASP.

DONOVAN

BT

CYPHER

PRIORITY

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
20 MAY 1974
NBR 10/1

1143

MOD DISTRIBUTION

ME

hntw/20/8

NNNN

Confidential

Reference

NBR 10/1

in Burton.

Iraq

Hovercraft.

You should see - 1 - the Shah
is not an obstacle to supply but Kuwait
views still need to be carefully
considered.

2 We now need the assessment,
long overdue, from MOD Sales. The Shah
has a good point in the last line of
para 2.

3. You will see from Donovan's

letter that there is an additional
though tentative interest in military
hovercraft.

B 9/174

DWF E 888/16 (788)

MOD DISTRIBUTION

40

LKS NR 857/16

PP MODUK ARMY

GR 98

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 160830Z

CONFIDENTIAL



Mr. Byrd

TO PRIORITY MODUK ARMY TEL NO DIG EOW OF 16 MAY.

FOR DEF SALES 1B FROM DA.

ICL COMPUTER CONTRACT.

CONTRACT IN LAST STAGES OF FINALISATION.

MEETING WITH IRAQ MOD AND DG OF NCC ON SUNDAY 19 MAY TO DISCUSS

SERVICE SUPPORT WILL HELP ICL FINALISE CONTRACT.

MINUTES OF OUR MEETING NOT ARRIVED HERE, PLEASE SEND BY TELEGRAM

PRECIS OF MINUTES TO INCLUDE MAIN POINTS AND DECISIONS TO

ENABLE ME TO TALK SENSE AT IRAQI MOD MEETING.

DONOVAN

BT

1026

NNNN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-



41

Miss C Lamb
Sales 1b
Ministry of Defence
Stuart House

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 27 May 1974

Dear Miss Lamb,

IRAQ: ARTILLERY ANCILLIARY EQUIPMENT

Thank you for your letter D/Sales/113/18/1 of 13 May.

2. There is no political objection to the supply of the equipment listed in your letter to Iraq.

3. I am copying this letter to the other members of the AWP.

Yours sincerely,

Miss M R McIntosh

MISS M R McINTOSH
Defence Department

I.A. [initials]

29 MAY 1974

MBR 10/1

42

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 200600Z

COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE.

NO DISTRIBUTIONDTI ~~VIC~~ ST

FRD

DIL ~~ADELPHI~~

TRD

~~ECGD~~

GEOG DEPT.....

~~MTD~~

TO ROUTINE CRED A TEL NO CRED A 59 OF 20 MAY.

WESTLAND HELICOPTERS.

1. TWO IRAQI AIR FORCE OFFICERS, MAJORS AHMED NAZAR ABDUL RAHMAN AND ABIDOWN HAMEED ARE VISITING UK FROM 20 MAY TO SEE WESTLAND HELICOPTERS OF YEOVIL, ROLLS ROYCE OF BRISTOL AND MANY OTHER COMPANIES CONCERNED WITH SUPPLY OF SPARES FOR WESSEX HELICOPTERS AND HUNTER AIRCRAFT. MAJOR SANDERS HERE HAS SENT LIST OF COMPANIES TO BE VISITED TO P.D. BRITAIN OF DEFENCE SALES 1B, IN HIS LETTER OF 10/7 OF 18 MAY.
2. THE TWO IAF MAJORS HAVE TOLD US TALE OF WOE ABOUT POOR SERVICE FOR THE 12 WESSEX HELICOPTERS IAF PURCHASED IN 1963/64. GRATEFUL FOR ANY HELP YOU, IN LIASON WITH BRITAIN OF DEFENCE SALES, COULD GIVE THEM. THEY COULD BE CONTACTED AT IRAQI EMBASSY.
3. INTERNATIONAL COMPUTERS NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAQI MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (SEE LETTER FROM CHANDOR OF ICL TNTHAIN OF 8/2/74) ARE AT DELICATE STAGE, NEAR FINALISATION, BUT WITH FRENCH COMPETITOR C11 HERE AND STILL IN THE RUNNING. CONTRACT IS EXPECTED TO BE SIGNED MID JUNE. HELP GIVEN TO IAF ON HELICOPTER SPARES AND SERVICE MIGHT IMPROVE ICL'S CHANCES.

MCCLUNEY

43

GPS 39
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER/CAT-A-

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 30 MAY 1974 (NBR 10/1)
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FM FCO 291405Z

1.1. 12075

CONFIDENTIAL

1974

TO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT TELNO 173 OF 29/5/INFO TEHERAN.

MODUK PE TELEGRAM 221630Z MAY REFERS: HOVERCRAFT FOR IRAQ.

1. THE WIRES HAVE GOT CROSSED AT THIS END. THE POSITION IS AS STATED IN OUR TELEGRAM TO TEHERAN NO. 147 AND JONES SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT VOLUNTEER ANY INFORMATION ON THE SUBJECT TO THE KUWAITIS. IF ASKED HE SHOULD PROFESS IGNORANCE AND REFER BACK HERE FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

CALLAGHAN

FILES:
MED
MR. WEIR

COPIES TO:
DEFENCE SALES 1, MOD

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: P D BRITTAIN, AD Sales 1B

44

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 - 4 JUN 1974 MB R10/1

4707

Major J Y Sanders
British Embassy
Baghdad
c/o Outward Bag Room
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
LONDON SW1

D/Sales/113/48/3

30 May 1974

MARCONI IN IRAQ

- n/c.

M. Laffey to see
W. B. L.

enc 13/6
HA

Thank you for your letter 10/7 of 15 May.

As you surmise, an Iraqi request to Marconi to supply ZB 298 and Tank Gun Stabilisation Kits could pose problems. We remain sensitive to the possible repercussions of supplying to Iraq anything resembling offensive equipment at the present time. I hope therefore that if pressed by Marconi you will be able to steer them away from ambitions such as these.

Equally I hope that Marconi are not getting into deep water over the prospect of installing the HF Communications equipment that you refer to. They have mentioned nothing of this to me. Beyond this I cannot comment on what is clearly at this stage a hypothetical situation. But if you get the opportunity to speak to them again on this matter it might be as well to suggest that time and effort might be saved by consultation in London before they go too far in committing themselves to what might prove an embarrassing enterprise.

P. D. Brittain

CONFIDENTIAL

Hidden Copy to P. Williams FCO

RESTRICTED

From: Major J.Y. Sanders



DEFENCE, MILITARY & AIR ATTACHÉS
BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD

15 May 1974

Ref: 10/7

P.D. Brittain Esq.,
Defence Sales 1B,
Ministry of Defence,
Stuart House,
23 Soho Square,
London W1V5FJ

Dear Mr Brittain

MARCONI IN IRAQ

I had a visit today from Mr Graham J. Linnell in Beirut with Marconi Middle East.

The United Arab Command purchased some £1m of HF Communication equipment from Marconi in 1967. Iraqs share of this has been rotting in store here since then and they have just signed a contract to inspect it with a view to installing it at a later date. The total cost to Iraq being some £42,700. In the course of our meeting I learned that Iraq is very keen to purchase:


- a. 2B298
- b. Tank Gun stabilisation kits

In the case of the 2B298 Mr Linnell tells me Defence Sales have already turned down the possibility of this. This seems surprising in view of the fact that they are a relatively "old" piece of kit and secondly they could not be classified as hardware. Is there any possibility of this decision being reconsidered. In the case of the Tank gun stabilisation kits I would not hazard a guess on present re-action to this but it would be interesting to know.

Marconi seem very keen to break into the Iraqi market as they are realising the potential.

I had a good trip back here. It was good to meet you and to discuss the various outstanding points. I hope I shall have the pleasure of entertaining you out here before the end of my tour.

I am looking forward to seeing the minutes of our Computer meeting.




Yours sincerely
John Sanders



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-



Miss C Lamb
Ministry of Defence
Defence Sales
Stuart House
23 Soho Square
W1V 5FJ

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 4 June 1974

Dear Miss Lamb,

1. Please refer to your letter D/Sales/113/18/1 dated 3 April about the supply of 101" Land Rovers and one for trailers to Iraq.
2. There is no political objection to the supply of these vehicles and trailers.
3. I am copying this letter to members of the AWP.

Yours sincerely
C G Lane


C G LANE
Defence Department

11.5/6

From: O. Ogun, Sales Supply 5b, Room 1144

(46)

Enter Med



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

St Christopher House, Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext 3631

NBR10/1

Any objections please? 7/6

Your reference

Colin Khan

Our reference D/Sales/
523/10/12

Date 6 June, 1974.

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
London, SW1.

Dr MG
objection
LW/6

Dear Miss McIntosh,

We have been asked by the Military Attache,
Iraqi Embassy, Brussels, to quote for the supply of
Qty.80 Cartridge Ejector Release Units No.1 Mk.3.

There are no Service stocks available for sale;
supply would therefore be from new production. The
estimated value of the CERU is about £560.

Will you please say if there is any objection to
this order being fulfilled.

Yours sincerely,
[Signature]

Head of DS 13
MOD DS 13b
MOD Defence Policy Staff
DTI (EPB)
Treasury (Defence Materiel Dept.)
Sales 1b

LETTER FROM THE DTI
DATED 9 JANUARY 1974
REFERENCE AW/59/085

Reference

(47)

We received this over the telephone on 14 Jan 1974

TO: P D BRITTAIN ESQ, AD SALES 1B

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY NO 35

10 JAN 1974

CONVERSION OF CIVIL HOVERCRAFT

MBR10/1

You have asked for advice on the resources involved in conversion of civil hovercraft of SRN 6 and CC7 type to military use from the points of view of:

- (a) ease of conversion
- (b) time required to convert
- (c) resources necessary.

Obviously the answers depend on the modification state at the beginning and end of the process.

No fully armed hovercraft has yet been built. LMGs are fitted to some craft. The two existing military CC7s of the British Army for example are modified relatively little from the three civil craft so far built; the craft are small and light and are used as personnel carriers or reconnaissance vehicles. The main changes are the fitting of Army communications equipment and the reduction of seating on account of the greater consequent unladen weight. A more recent and hence more powerful engine was fitted but this would now constitute the normal civil standard. No armament is fitted. If it were it would reduce the seating still further. Overall, one could say that a civil CC7 would be no more and no less easily converted than would a fast pleasure boat.

Two or three weeks work by radio fitters would cover most of the effort needed. The standard civilian CC7 is an eight seat craft. All production craft have transport joints in the hull, which enables an additional 64 inch length section to be fitted; this stretched version increases the seating to fourteen, with little ~~degradation~~ degradation of performance. (To date, no stretched version has been built).

The SRN 6 has several military conversions, one of which (the vehicle-carrying SRN 6 Mark 5) requires major structural modifications for which the expertise probably only exists at Cowes. Other military conversions have a widened front door (which could be specified by a civil purchaser) a strengthened roof forward with gulling or observation dome, and a "soft top" through which cargo could be lowered. None of these modifications could be completed quickly; even at the factory, probably three to four months by a team of skilled metal workers would be needed. The result would again be a logistic or reconnaissance craft rather than a fighting vehicle.

Signed

J W Leahh, Hov.B Division

LKS NR 852/9

48

RR MODUK ARMY

RR DAMASCUS

RR BEIRUT

GR 100

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 090800Z

CONFIDENTIAL



No no in stimulating

interest, I must

Mr. Barker

No risk 7/6
ja

MOD DISTRIBUTION

MED

TO ROUTINE MODUK ARMY TEL NO DIG EBR OF 9 JUNE ALSO TO
DAMASCUS AND BEIRUT FOR D.A.

FOR CAMERON DEF SALES 1B FROM SANDERS.

TANK TRANSPORTERS FOR IRAQ.

YOUR EBR 041400Z JUNE AND FIELDS EBR/EDW/FOH 300945Z OF MAY 73.

MUCH OF WHAT FOLLOWS IS HEARSAY.

IT WAS UNDERSTOOD FROM MY PREDECESSOR AND REF THAT IRAQ
ARMY APPROACHED LEYLANDS FOR 700 SCAMMELL TYPE TANK TPTS
MID 73 BUT UK EXPORT LICENCE WAS REFUSED.

SUBSEQUENTLY AN ORDER FOR 400 WAS PLACED WITH FOHN OF W.GERMANY
IN ABOUT NOV/DEC 73.

IT IS BELIEVED THAT FOHN WOULD BE UNABLE TO PRODUCE
THE TOTAL NUMBER REQUIRED BY SYRIA AND IRAQ AND FURTHER
APPROACHES WERE MADE TO FRENCH FIRMS FOR SYRIAS REQUIREMENTS.

MCCLUNEY

BT

NNNN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-



O Ogun Esq
Sales Supply 5b
Ministry of Defence
St Christopher House

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 12 June 1974

Dear Ogun,

CARTRIDGE EJECTOR RELEASE UNITS FOR IRAQ

1. Please refer to your letter D/Sales/523/10/12 of 6 June about the supply of 80 Cartridge Ejector Release Units No 1 Mk 3 to Iraq.
2. There are no political objections to the supply of these items.
3. I am copying this letter to recipients of yours.

Yours sincerely
C G Lane

C G LANE
Defence Department

CONFIDENTIAL

50

ERS 630
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A

TOP COPY

RECEIVED IN REGISTER NO 35 15 JUN 1974 MBR10/1

FM BAGHDAD 171100Z JUNE.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 215 OF 17 JUNE 1974, INFO
DEF SALES IB AND DI 4.

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ.

1. AT MFA MEETING TODAY SD TAQA RAISED WITH ME SALE OF
HS 1182 HAWK TRAINER AIRCRAFT AND CYMBELINE RADAR TO
IRAQ.

2. TAQA SAID IRAQ NOW WISHED TO PURCHASE THESE ITEMS
AND REQUESTED A FIRM OFFER BY 31 JULY FOR HAWK TRAINER AND
NOW FOR CYMBELINE. HE ASKED FOR OUR OFFER ON AIRCRAFT
TO BE GIVEN TO HIM BY ME OR TO CGS BY SANDERS.

v. odd the
lettering is
assumed to
be the origin of
a letter
with symbols
manipulated
a few days later.

we must avoid this
it could lead to a
gross to gross trap.

3. TO DATE ENQUIRIES AND PRESSURES HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AT
SANDERS AS FOLLOWS FOR HS 1182.

A) APPROACH BY DIR AIR TRAINING REPORTED TO DEF SALES
AND DEF DEPT IN TEL EDW/FOH 070800Z FEB. FOR LITERATURE
COST AND DELIVERY DATES.

B) BACKGROUND LETTER TO DEF SALES 10/7 OF 18 FEB.

C) FCO REPLY TEL NO 031 OF 20 FEB.

D) SECOND APPROACH BY DIR AIR TRAINING REPORTED TO
DEF SALES AND DEF DEPT IN LETTER 10/7 OF 16 MAR. MINIMUM
REQUIREMENT FOR 30 X AIRCRAFT. (L26 m)

E) DIR AIR TRAINING MADE DIRECT APPROACH TO HS DURING
VISIT TO U.K. 20 MAR TO MID APR.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ F)

F) SANDERS DISCUSSED WITH M.E. DEPT. DEF DEPT AND DEF SALES ON VISIT END APR.

G) APPROX PRICE OF £875,000 AND DELIVERY DATE OF 2 YEARS PASSED TO IRAQIS WITHOUT ANY COMMITMENT AS A RESULT OF DEF SALES SIG COPY TO NENAD FCO EBR 131600Z MAY.

H) FURTHER APPROACHES MADE BY IAF IN JUNE. IAF HAVE LITERATURE AND ALL UP TO DATE HS REPORTS.

4. FOR CYMBELINE.

A) REPS FROM IRAQ MOD VISITED EMI 1973 TO VIEW.

B) CORRIS OF EMI VISITED DIR OF ARMAMENTS AND SUPPLIES MAR 74 REPORTED TO SANDERS IRAQ REQUEST FOR INITIAL ORDER OF 12 CYMBELINE EQPTS WORTH APPROX. £4M.

C) SANDERS REPORTED FACTS ON VISIT TO DEF SALES.

D) DIR OF ARMAMENTS AND SUPPLIES SUMMONED SANDERS TO MOD FOR ANSWER ON CYMBELINE. FACTS REPORTED TO DEF SALES IN LETTER 10/41 OF 12 JUNE AND SIGNAL EBR 141400Z JUNE.

E) CORRIS ARRIVES BAGHDAD TOMORROW.

5. THIS IS ONLY PART OF SEVERAL ENQUIRIES FOR EQUIPT OF NON HARDWARE NATURE AND IRAQS STATED INTENTION OF WISHING TO PURCHASE MORE EQPT FROM US. MARCONIS ALSO INVOLVED WITH RADAR ZB 298, SANDERS LETTER 10/7 OF 15 MAY TO DEF SALES REFERS, AND DIRECTOR OF ARMAMENTS AND SUPPLIES IN PROCESS OF COMPILING LIST OF ALL IRAQI DEMANDS PUT THROUGH THEIR DEF ATTACHE IN BRUSSELS IN LAST YEAR WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. SANDERS HAS BEEN TOLD BY IRAQI MOD THAT THEY ARE WELL AWARE THAT WITH OUR COMMITMENTS TO IRAN AND KUWAIT WE WOULD NOT ENTERTAIN BIDS FOR OFFENSIVE WEAPONS BUT THAT THERE ARE MANY ITEMS THAT THEY WOULD LIKE FROM US WHICH DO NOT FALL INTO THIS CATEGORY. YOU MAY THINK THIS MFA APPROACH AN ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE PACE ON DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ, AND TO GAUGE THE DEPTH OF OUR DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. 11

MCCLUNEY

[SENT TO DCC]

F I L E S

MED

DEFENCE D

PUSD

IRD

GIPD

NEWS D

PS

PS/MR ENNALS

PS/PUS

MR CAMPBELL

SIR G ARTHUR

MR WEIR

MR THOMSON

Defence Sales Div.

RECEIVED IN REGISTER No 35 30 APR 1974 Span - Original MBP10/6

3

li Burt^{29/4} N.B.
li Rafter^W
then R^{Spoken} and pa.

29/4

Cop sent to DS13

GRS 60

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A
FM TEHRAN 270800Z
CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 204 OF 27 APRIL.1974
INFO PARIS, MODUK.

DEFENCE SALES

I WAS INFORMED RELIABLY BUT IN STRICT CONFIDENCE YESTERDAY
THAT GENERAL TOUFANIAN (WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROCUREMENT
FOR THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES) HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE
SHAH TO PURCHASE NOTHING MORE FROM THE FRENCH FOLLOWING
RECENT PUBLICITY FOR FRENCH ARMS DEALS WITH IRAQ.

PARSONS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

FILES:

DEFENCE DEPT
MED
WED
PUSD
IRD
GIPD
NEWS D
PS/MR. ENNALS
PS/MR. HATTERSLEY
SIR G. ARTHUR
MR. THOMSON
MOD(INTERNAL)

CONFIDENTIAL



RESTRICTED

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 15 JUN 1974 NBR10/1

51

Chancery
British Embassy
TEHRAN

Your reference

LA Q18/6.

Our reference ~~NBR 10/2~~

Date 17 June 1974

Mr Chancery,

ARMS SALES: IRAQ

1 The Iraqis have placed an order (copy attached) with MOD for a mixed bag of military aids described as artillery ancillary equipment. The stuff is harmless and can probably be purchased from non-military sources. Normally, it would not be considered necessary to oppose such a sale but Sir Lester Suffield is hesitant on this occasion in case the Iranians should take exception. I should be grateful for confirmation that we can reassure Sir Lester on this point.

Yours ever,

P A Raftery

P A Raftery
Middle East Department

RESTRICTED

From: O. Ogun, Sales Supply 5b, Room 1144



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext 3631

(52)

Inter Med

Mr Raftery
Any objections?

Colm & Lamb

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
London, SW1.

RECEIVED IN No 35 16 JUN 1974 MBR10/1
--

Your reference

Our reference D/Sales/
523/10/12

Date 11 June, 1974.

Dear Miss McIntosh,

We have received a request from Hawker Siddeley Aviation Ltd. on behalf of IRAQ for supply of Qty.2 Relay Series Type 'B' with Mod. EL 1268. The Relay is a maintenance item used on Siddeley Hunter aircraft as an arming electrical device and could be supplied from RAF stocks.

Will you please say if there is any objection to the supply of these stores.

Yours sincerely,
[Signature]

Copy to:

Head of DS 13
MOD DS 13b
MOD Defence Policy Staff
DTI (EPB)
Treasury (Defence Material Dept.)
Sales 1b

No (Med)
objection.

I. Halli

14/6



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-



O Ogun Esq
Sales Supply 5b
Ministry of Defence
St Christopher House

Your reference

Our reference

Date 19 June 1974

Dear Ogun,

1. 18/1

1. Please refer to your letter D/Sales/523/10/12 of 11 June to Miss McIntosh about the supply of Qty 2 Relay Series Type 'B' to Iraq.
2. There are no political objections to the supply of these stores.
3. I am sending a copy of this letter to recipients of yours.

Yours sincerely
C G Lane

C G LANE
Defence Department

MOD DISTRIBUTION

54



GRS 100

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 171230Z JUNE.

UK EYES ONLY

SECRET

TO PRIORITY MODUK ARMY TEL OF 17 JUNE 1974.

DIG FOH.
FROM SANDERS.

FRENCH MA.

YOUR FOH 141200Z JUNE REFERS.

1. FRENCH MA LEFT BAGHDAD 31 MAY WITH WIFE ON LEAVE RETURNING BAGHDAD 7 JULY.
2. THERE WAS RUMOUR IN MA GROUP THAT HE WAS LOOKING AFTER ARMS DELEGATION FROM IRAQ WHILST IN FRANCE.
3. SPOKE TO FRENCH COUNSELLOR SAILLARD ON LINES OF PARA 2 ABOVE. HE DENIED THAT MILITARY DELEGATION WAS VISITING FRANCE. THAT MA WAS PURELY ON LEAVE EXCEPT FOR ANNUAL PILOT REFRESHER TRG. HE DID AGREE THAT FROM TIME TO TIME IRAQI MILITARY PERSONNEL VISITED FRANCE TO DISCUSS FURTHER MILITARY SUPPLIES AND PROVISION OF SPARE PARTS BUT TO THE BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE NO ONE WAS THERE AT THE MOMENT.
4. I KNOW SAILLARD WELL AND I BELIEVE HIM.

MCCLUNEY
BT

Mr. Bunting 18/6

Mr. Raftery.

E.M.A. 19/6

LKS NR 948/19

00 DEFENCE SALES MODUK ARMY


00 FCO

GR 130

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 190915Z

CONFIDENTIAL



MOD DISTRIBUTION

These visas have
been cleared 26/6
MB

TO IMMEDIATE DEFENCE SALES 1B TEL NO DIG RBU/RBU OF 19 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE TO FCO FOR DEF DEPT AND ME DEPT.

VISAS FOR 13 IRAQI AIR FORCE AND ARMY OFFICERS TO ATTEND ICL AND
ARMY COMPUTER TRG IN UK.

ONE. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN ICL ARRIVING BAGHDAD TODAY TO
FORMALLY SIGN CONTRACT WITH CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF.

TWO. IRAQIS ACCUSING ICL OF DELIBERATELY PREVARICATING OVER
ISSUE OF VISAS DESPITE FACT THAT THEY KNOW ITS OUT OF ICL HANDS.

THREE. ATMOSPHERE IS UNPLEASANT AND COULD JEOPORDISE THE
FUTURE BUSINESS HERE WHICH COULD BE SUBSTANTIAL.

FOUR. ANY DELAY ON VISAS FOR 13 OFFICERS BEYOND SATURDAY
22 JUN COULD SERIOUSLY DISRUPT AN ALREADY REORGANISED COMPLEX
TRAINING PROGRAMME.

FIVE. COULD YOU ASK FCO VISA DEPT TO TRY AND SIGNAL ANY ANSWER
ON THESE VISA APPLICATIONS BEFORE OFFICIAL SIGNING OF
CONTRACE PM 20 JUNE.

MCCLUNEY

BT

55

Mr. Byrdon.
IA. 12/6

10272

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER/CAT-A-

GPS 274

FM FCO 201700Z

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY NO 35

TOP COPY
21 JUN 1974

(NBR 10/1)

56

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TO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN TELNO 237 OF 20/6⁷⁴ INFO BAGHDAD KUWAIT AND
JEDDA.

ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. THE IRAQIS ARE SHOWING INCREASING INTEREST IN PURCHASING ARMS FROM US. HM CHARGE^E IN BAGHDAD HAS REPORTED THAT THEY ARE COMPILING A LIST BASED ON REQUESTS FOR PURCHASES WHICH WE HAVE REFUSED IN THE PAST. IN THE MEANTIME, THEY HAVE REQUESTED AN OFFER OF SALE FOR THE HS 1182 HAWK TRAINER AIRCRAFT AND THE CYMBELINE MORTAR-LOCATING RADAR BY 31 JULY. THE BUSINESS COULD BE WORTH £30 M.

2. THE HS 1182 IS A SUBSONIC AIRCRAFT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO REPLACE THE HUNTERS AND GNATS IN THEIR TRAINING ROLES, THOUGH IT CAN BE MODIFIED TO A GROUND ATTACK FUNCTION. IT HAS ONLY JUST GONE INTO PRODUCTION AND HAS NOT BEEN SOLD OVERSEAS; DELIVERY IS TWO YEARS. CYMBELINE IS PURELY DEFENSIVE AND THERE ARE AT PRESENT SECURITY RESTRICTIONS ON SUPPLYING IT TO IRAQ. A FURTHER FACTOR IS THAT IRAN, KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA HAVE SHOWN AN INTEREST IN IT.

3. HM CHARGE^E SUGGESTS THAT THIS REQUEST IS AN ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE PACE WITH US ON DEFENCE SALES AND TO GAUGE THE DEPTH OF OUR DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. WE HAVE NOT YET CONSULTED MINISTERS. BEFORE DOING SO WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SHAH'S CURRENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS SALES TO IRAQ (A) IN GENERAL AND (B) BY US (BEARING IN MIND THAT WE WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO CONSIDER OTHER THAN NON-OFFENSIVE AND RELATIVELY UNSOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT), IN THE LIGHT OF HIS REACTION TO THE FRENCH DEALS AS REPORTED IN YRTELNO. 204. YRTELNO. 211 IS ALSO RELEVANT.

CALLAGHAN
FILES
MED
DEFENCE D
NENAD
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR

COPIES TO
DS13 MOD
SALES 1 MOD

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A
GR 300

CONFIDENTIAL

FM TEHRAN 230950Z JUN

CONFIDENTIAL

1974

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 324 OF 23 JUNE /RPTD FOR INFO TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, JEDDAH.

YOUR TEL NO 237 : ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 25 JUN 1974 MBR10/1

1. AS YOU KNOW THE SHAH IS GENERALLY SENSITIVE ON THIS SUBJECT:

Burton

(A) BECAUSE OF HIS UNCERTAIN RELATIONS WITH IRAQ AND HIS EXPOSED WESTERN FRONTIER,

(B) BECAUSE OF THE KURDISH QUESTION.

(C) BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE IRAQI THREATS TO KUWAIT AND OTHER GULF STATES.

THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN IN TROUBLE WITH HIM FOR SUPPLYING OR SUPPORTING THE IRAQIS; SO HAVE THE INDIANS. ALTHOUGH IN THE CURRENT MOOD OF EUPHORIA CHARACTERISING FRANCO/IRANIAN RELATIONS, ON THE EVE OF THE SHAH'S STATE VISIT, PAST SINS MAY BE BEING OVERLOOKED, WE SHOULD ASSUME THAT THE SHAH WILL KEEP A CLOSE EYE ON WHAT IS BEING SUPPLIED TO IRAQ BY ANY OF HIS FRIENDS, ALTHOUGH OF COURSE IRAQ'S ARMS SUPPLIES FROM THE SOVIET UNION ARE HIS PRINCIPAL WORRY.

2. THESE CONSIDERATIONS APPLY PARTICULARLY IN THE CASE OF BRITAIN, A CENTO ALLY AND MAJOR SOURCE OF ARMS FOR IRAN HERSELF.

✓ THE SHAH WOULD CERTAINLY EXPECT US TO CONSULT HIM IN ADVANCE ABOUT ANY SALE OF ARMS TO THE IRAQIS. I DO NOT THINK HE WOULD AUTOMATICALLY REACT ADVERSELY. I HAVE NOT MYSELF BROACHED THIS SUBJECT WITH HIM, BUT MY PREDECESSOR'S APPROACH OVER HOVERCRAFT, ADMITTEDLY BEFORE THE RECENT DETERIORATION OF IRAQI/IRANIAN RELATIONS, WAS RECEIVED REALISTICALLY AND SYMPATHETICALLY (SEE ARBUTHNOTT'S LETTER OF 31 DECEMBER 1973 TO BURTON, MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT, NOT COPIED TO BAGHDAD). THE SHAH MIGHT WELL TAKE THE VIEW IN PRINCIPLE THAT ANYTHING WHICH IS LIKELY TO LOOSEN THE SOVIET HOLD WOULD BE WORTH DOING.

/ 3. EVEN

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3. EVEN IF HE TOOK THIS VIEW I CANNOT BE SURE HOW HE WOULD REACT IN THE SPECIFIC CASES OF THE HS 1182 AND CYMBELINE. THE FORMER, IF MODIFIED, COULD CLEARLY BE USED OFFENSIVELY AGAINST IRAN DURING BORDER CLASHES. EQUALLY, IT COULD BE USED AGAINST THE KURDS. CYMBELINE, ALTHOUGH "PURELY DEFENSIVE", WOULD HELP THE IRAQIS IN ANY OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE KURDS TO THE EXTENT THAT IT HELPED THEM TO LOCATE AND NEUTRALISE KURDISH MORTARS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CASE WOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE AS CLEAR AS THAT AGAINST THE SALE OF TANK TRANSPORTERS TO IRAQ (TEHRAN TEL NO 637 OF 1973 NOT REPEATED).

4. I RECOMMEND THAT, IF IT IS DECIDED THAT WE SHOULD PROBE IRAQI INTENTIONS FURTHER, I SHOULD FIRST BE AUTHORISED TO TAKE THE SHAH INTO OUR CONFIDENCE AND THAT A FINAL DECISION SHOULD BE MADE IN THE LIGHT OF HIS REACTIONS.

PARSONS

FILES:

MED
DEF D
NENAD
MR. CAMPBELL
MR. WEIR

COPIES TO:
DS 13, MOD
SALES 1, MOD

- 2 -

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58

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CYPHER/CAT A
ROUTINE 201100Z JUN 1974
FM MOD UK
TO BRIT EMB BAGHDAD
INFO FCO NENAD

BT



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DIG EBR

FOR SANDERS FROM CAMERON PD YOUR 190915Z REFERS PD
APPLICATIONS FOR BISAS DID NOT ARRIVE IN FCO UNTIL 18 JUNE PD
NOW BEING PROCESSED WITH ALL POSSIBLE SPEED PD FCO WILL SIGNAL
YOU BEFORE CLOSE OF PLAY ON FRIDAY PD

BT

FILES
DEFENCE D
MED
NENAD
MR THOMSON



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CONFIDENTIAL

BR 70

59

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 240945Z

CONFIDENTIAL



TO IMMEDIATE MODUK ARMY TEL NO DIG OFL/OQB/OYS/FOH OF 24 JUNE 1974
INFO ROUTINE TO FCO AND ESBOT.

FOR MDS 1B FROM DA.
EMERGENCY BRIDGING EQPT FOR RAILWAYS.

1. WE HAVE HAD A HIGH LEVEL APPROACH FROM MFA ASKING US TO SUPPLY THIS EQPT IN SPANS UP TO 40 FEET.
2. THEY NEED THE EQPT URGENTLY AND IF WE ARE ABLE AND AGREE TO SUPPLY THEY WISH TO SEND A DELEGATION TO UK TO VIEW EQUIPMENT AND DISCUSS DETAILS.
3. NO OTHER DETAILS SUPPLIED.

MCCLUNEY

SENT TO DCC

FILES

MED
DEFENCE DEPT
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR
SIR G ARTHUR

COPIES TO:

DTI (ESBOT)

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GRS 110

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 240445Z JUNE.

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 224 OF 24 JUNE 1974.
INFO ROUTINE TEHERAN, KUWAIT AND JEDDA.

(56)

YOUR TEL NO 237 TO TEHERAN. CYMBELINE FOR IRAQ.

1. IN FACT IRAQIS REQUESTED OFFER ON CYMBELINE NOW AND
HS 1182'S BY 31 JULY.

2. AS YOU KNOW FROM TEL 220830Z TO MODUK ARMY, CORRIS
OF EMI AGREED A CONTRACT FOR SALE OF TWELVE RADARS, 4 REPAIR
VEHICLES AND ONE BASE WKSP IN BAGHDAD ON 20 JUNE. THE
APPEARANCE OF CORRIS WAS FORTUITOUS BUT IS NEVERTHELESS
A QUICK RESPONSE TO IRAQI REQUEST OF 17 JUNE.

3. U/SECY TAQA (MFA) HAD THE IMPRESSION WHEN HE SPOKE TO ME
THAT DELAY IN CYMBELINE OFFER WAS DUE TO EMI'S NEGOTIATIONS
ON EXPORT LICENCE. I MADE NO COMMENT.

4. CONTRACT IS FIRMLY SUBJECT TO THE ISSUE OF A LICENCE
AND I HOPE TAQA DOES NOT THINK THAT THE MATTER HAS BEEN RESOLVED.

MCCLUNEY

FILES
MED
DEFENCE D
NENAD
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR

COPIES TO: DS 13 MOD

SALES 1 MOD

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Mr. Britain of Defence Sales told me that the Corris of R.M.I. had proceeded with these negotiations in the face of his advice to the contrary. Cymbeline carries an MoD confidential security classification and is not therefore available to outside body, which is not allowed any classified material. (25/6)

GRS 170
PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 26 JUN 1974 NBR10/1

FM BAGHDAD 220830Z JUNE.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO PRIORITY MODUK ARMY TEL OF 22 JUNE 1974, INFO
PRIORITY DEF DEPT AND PRIORITY FCO (MED).

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 27 24 JUN 1974
--

DIG EBR.
FOR MDS 1 B.
FROM SANDERS.

CYMBELINE FOR IRAQ.

1. CORRIS AND BROOKS (MILITARY CONTRACTS MANAGER) FROM
EMI COMPLETED DISCUSSIONS WITH IRAQ MOD 20 JUN.
2. A CONTRACT WAS QUICKLY AGREED FOR THE PROVISION
OF 12 RADARS WITH SPARES, 4 MOBILE REPAIR VEHICLES AND
ONE BASE WKSP.
3. THE CONTRACT HAS NOT BEEN SIGNED BUT IRAQIS SAY
THEY WILL DO SO AS SOON AS THEY RECIEVE IT.
4. CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO THE GRANTING OF AN EXPORT
LICENSE BY HMG. IF A LECENSE IS ISSUED BEFORE 1 JAN 75
CONTRACT IS VALID. IF A LICENSE IS ISSUED
AFTER 1 JAN 75 PRICES ARE SUBJECT TO RE-NEGOTIATION WITHIN
2 MONTHS.

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/5. ALTHOUGH

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5. ALTHOUGH CORRIS EXPECTED DIFFICULTIES WITH IRAQIS OVER EXPORT LICENCE QUESTION THESE DID NOT ARISE, OTHER THAN THEIR REQUEST THAT EMI SHOULD APPLY FOR THE LICENSE.

6. CONTRACT IS WORTH ABOUT £4 M. AND IRAQIS SAID THEY WOULD WANT MORE. THEY INTENDED BUYING LANDROVERS TO TOW CYMBELINE AND BEDFORD TRUCKS TO MOUNT REPAIR VEHICLES ON.

MCCLUNEY

[SENT TO D C C]

FILES
DEFENCE DEPT
M E D
MR THOMSON
MR WEIR
MR CAMPBELL

-2-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 45

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 250630Z JUNE.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 228 OF 25 JUNE 1974.

ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. TWO MIFTS CONTAIN BACKGROUND WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE IN CONSOLIDATED FORM AND WILL NOT OTHERWISE REACH YOU 'TILL 5 JULY BAG.

2. PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY TO OTHER POSTS. AND MOD. |

MCCLUNEY

F I L E S
M E D
D E F E N C E D

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

62

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 26 JUN 1974 MBR10/1

I do not think
it is necessary
to repeat either
telegram.

R-76.

63

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RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
26 JUN 1974
MBR10/1

TOP COPY

GRS 220

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 250635Z JUNE.

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 229 OF 25 JUNE 1974.

ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. KNOWN BRITISH INTEREST IN SALES TO IRAQ MOD

- | | | |
|----|--|---------|
| A) | MILITARY HOSPITAL. | £50-70M |
| B) | 30 X HS 1182. | £30M. |
| C) | CYMBELINE RADAR (POSSIBLE FURTHER ORDERS) | £4M. |
| D) | ICL COMPUTERS. CONTRACT SIGNED AND
SUBJECT TO EXPORT LICENCE. | £1M |
| E) | 500 X LWB LAND ROVERS. (FURTHER
2950 L/R'S ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION
OR ON ORDER BY OTHER MINISTRIES). | £0.5M. |
| F) | MEDICAL EQUIPMENT. | £0.5M |
| G) | SPARES FOR EXISTING BRITISH EQUIPMENT. | £0.5M |
| H) | RANGEFINDERS. <i>(probably low range finder for tanks)</i> | |
| I) | NIGHT SIGHTS. | |
| J) | SIMFIRE. | |
| K) | MARCONI ZB 298 TANK STABILISATION KITS | SENSOR |
| L) | BRITTAIN NORMAN ISLANDERS. | |
| M) | RACAL COMMS SYSTEMS. | £3-5M |
| N) | BATTLE RATION STORES. | £0.5M |
| O) | PLESSEY CONVERSION OF RUSSIAN RADAR. | £0.5M |
| P) | DENNIS FIRE ENGINES. | £0.8M |

THE TOTAL INCLUDING HOSPITAL IS OVER £100M BUT THERE ARE NO WEAPONS IN THE LIST.

2. DEFENCE TRAINING.

SUMMARY OF CURRENT BIDS FOR COURSES IN U.K.

	COURSES	PLACES
IRAQ AIR FORCE (IAF)	16	46
IRAQ ARMY (IA)	53	115

IRAQ MOD HAS ASKED FOR HELP IN ESTABLISHING

- A) AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SCHOOL.
- B) ENGLISH LANGUAGE SCHOOL (IN ADDITION TO USE THEY MAKE OF IDELTI)

AND HAS REQUESTED ADVICE ON UPDATING TRAINING IN

- (I) IAF STAFF COLLEGE
- (II) IA STAFF COLLEGE
- (III) SCHOOL OF JOINT AIR WARFARE

WE SUPPLY TRAINING PUBLICATIONS.

MCCLUNEY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

MED
NENAD
EESD
DEFENCE D
PUSD
N AM D
NEWS D
RESEARCH D (SOV SECTION)
(AMER SECTION)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

DEFENCE SALES

RS 370

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 250715Z JUNE.

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 230 OF 25 JUNE 1974.

ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. IT MAY BE HELPFUL TO EXPLAIN MORE FULLY IRAQS REASONS FOR ASKING FOR HS 1182 AND CYMBELINE AS SEEN FROM BAGHDAD.

2. CLEARLY IT IS NOT BECAUSE THEY WISH TO BECOME WESTERN ORIENTED IN THEIR DEFENCE SUPPLY. THEY DO NOT WISH TO OFFEND THEIR EASTERN BLOC FRIENDS AT THIS STAGE. RATHER THEY WISH TO MAKE A SMALL SHOW OF THEIR INDEPENDENCE, RESPOND TO MILITARY PRESSURE FOR BETTER TOOLS, AND EXPLICITLY DEMONSTRATE TO IRAN AND KUWAIT THAT BRITAIN HAS RENEWED RELATIONS WITH THE BAATH IN IRAQ AND IS WILLING TO DO BUSINESS OVER A WIDE RANGE INCLUDING SOME DEFENCE EQUIPMENT.

3. THE CHRONIC INEFFICIENCY OF THEIR ARMED FORCES WAS BROUGHT HOME TO IRAQIS DURING THE YOM KIPPUR WAR. MANY SENIOR OFFICERS HAVE EXPRESSED TO SANDERS THEIR NEED TO RETAIN AND EXPAND THEIR OLD LINKS WITH THE BRITISH SERVICES AND THEIR USE OF OUR EQUIPMENT AND METHODS. THEY HAVE SUFFERED FROM OVER DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIA AND WILL NOW TAKE THE BEST THAT OTHERS CAN OFFER E.G. FRANCE, EGYPT, INDIA AND OURSELVES.

4. BUT THERE IS NO POSSIBILTY OF THEM ACQUIRING OFFENSIVE HARDWARE FROM US. TAQA IS AWARE OF OUR TREATY ? COMMITMENTS, AND HIS OWN. THE KUWAITIS AND IRANIANS COULD PERHAPS BE PERSUADED TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS IN ALL OUR INTERESTS TO HAVE THE WIDEST POSSIBLE RANGE OF CONTACTS WITH IRAQ, TO COUNTERACT SOVIET INFLUENCE AND BRING SOME WESTERN COMMON SENSE TO THEIR DEALINGS WITH THEIR

64

TOP COPY

RECEI
REGISTR. NO 35
26 JUN 1974
NR 2101

CONFIDENTIAL

NEIGHBOURS. IF THIS MEANS PANDERING TO THEIR INDEPENDENCE WITH RADAR SETS, TRAINER AIRCRAFT AND COMPUTERS IT DOES NOT SEEM A HIGH PRICE TO PAY.

5. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO AVOID OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OF THE ARAB WORLD PASSING THROUGH A LONG PERIOD OF MUTUAL SUSPICION, PARTICULARLY WHERE WE HAVE DEEP SOCIO-ECONOMIC LINKS TO BUILD ON AS IN IRAQ.

6. IF IN THE END WE DECIDE THERE ARE CERTAIN GOODS WE CANNOT SELL HERE, IRAQIS MAY MORE READILY ACCEPT THE POLITICAL EXPLANATION OF OUR DESIRE NOT TO INCREASE TENSION IN THE AREA THAN AN IMPLICATION THAT WE CANNOT RISK UPSETTING THE SHAH.

MCCLUNEY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

MED
NENAD
EESD
DEFENCE D
FUSD
N AM D
NEWS D
RESEARCH D (SOV SECTION)
(AMER SECTION)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

DEFENCE SALES

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 70

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 240645Z JUNE.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 227 OF 24 JUNE 1974.
INFO PRIORITY TEHERAN.

TEHERAN 324 TO FCO. PARA 3.

HS 1182 FOR IRAQ.

AS A TRAINER THIS AIRCRAFT CANNOT BE DESCRIBED AS OFFENSIVE. WE DOUBT IF THE IRAQIS HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO CONVERT TO A GROUND ATTACK FUNCTION, AND IN ANY CASE THEY HAVE ALREADY MANY AIRCRAFT IN THIS ROLE. USE OF THE HAWK TRAINER WILL ENABLE THEM TO EXPAND THEIR PILOT TRAINING PROGRAMME AND RELY LESS ON OUTSIDERS (E.G. THE RUSSIANS, THE INDIANS AND OURSELVES). IT WILL NOT NECESSARILY IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF THEIR PILOTS.

MCCLUNEY

FILES
MED
DEFENCE D
NENAD
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR

COPIES TO: DS 13 MOD
SALES 1 MOD

CONFIDENTIAL

65

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 26 JUN 1974 NBR10/1

TOP COPY

Whether the Hawk can be readily converted because the training version is already wired up for this: but I agree with Mr. McCune that the Iraqis would hardly buy this aircraft if they want a ground attack vehicle.

L27/6.

66

RR TEHRAN

GR 380

CYPHER/CAT A

FM F C O 271520Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE TEHRAN TELNO 246 OF 27 JUNE 1974.

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPARTMENT
WAS RECEIVED FROM BAGHDAD TELNO 230 OF 25 JUNE.


ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

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FOR ASKING FOR H S 1182 AND CYMBELINE AS SEEN FROM BAGHDAD.

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ORIENTED IN THEIR DEFENCE SUPPLY. THEY DO NOT WISH TO
OFFEND THEIR EASTER BLOC FRIENDS AT THIS STAGE. RATHER
THEY WISH TO MAKE A SMALL SHOW OF THEIR INDEPENDENCE,
RESPOND TO MILITARY PRESSURE FOR BETTER TOOLS, AND EXPLICITLY
DEMONSTRATE TO IRAN AND KUWAIT THAT BRITAIN HAS RENEWED
RELATIONS WITH THE BAATH IN IRAQ AND IS WILLING TO DO
BUSINESS OVER A WIDE RANGE INCLUDING SOME DEFENCE EQUIPMENT.

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BROUGHT HOME TO IRAQIS DURING THE YOM KIPPUR WAR. MANY
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RETAIN AND EXPAND THEIR OLD LINKS WITH THE BRITISH SERVICES
AND THEIR USE OF OUR EQUIPMENT AND METHODS. THEY HAVE SUFFERED
FROM OVER DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIA AND WILL NOW TAKE THE BEST THAT
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HARDWARE FROM US. TAQA IS AWARE OF OUR TREATY COMMITMENTS,
AND HIS OWN. THE KUWAITIS AND IRANIS COULD DEBARE BE



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CALLAGHAN

NNNN

Registry
No.

DRAFT

TELEGRAM

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

0

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:-

HM AMBASSADOR TEHRAN

FROM

Anderson MOD

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

Your tel no 237: ARMS SALES TO IRAQ

1. EMI have pressed us for approval for the sale of 12 Gymbelines with supporting equipment to Iraq. They are aware of the Iranian sensitivity about supplies to Iraq but they nevertheless wish to go ahead with the export if it is approved by HMG.
2. We accept your view that the Shah should be consulted in advance. In the circumstances we would be grateful if unofficial soundings could be taken of the Shah's attitude towards this potential sale. In order to keep matters on an informal basis perhaps the best way we can deal with the matter would be for Reporter to be asked to take the necessary soundings.
3. It would perhaps be as well to mention that the Iraqis seem anxious to improve their relations with the UK and that for many reasons, some of which are to the Shah's benefit, it would be desirable if this came about. Our attitude towards the sale of military equipment to Iraq will be an important aspect of our dealings with them. From our point of view the situation will not be easy, since they are asking for a number of items which we would probably refuse to supply.

/However,

*Held all
discussion Wright/
Anderson*

However, ~~Cymbelane~~ seems to us to be relatively innocuous and our willingness to supply this item might bring about an improvement ~~to supply~~ ~~this~~ in Anglo/Iraqi relations which ultimately holds some benefits for Iran.

IMMEDIATE

Anderson MOD ext 6828

Mr Anderson would like clearance from Patrick or Terry first as soon as possible before he sends it off

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

67

CYPHER CAT A

PRI ROU 251030Z JUN. 1974

FM MOD UK

TO BRIT EMB BAGHDAD

INFO FCO(NENAD)

ESBOT

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY N 35
28 JUN 1974
MBR10/1

hwauc 68.

CONFIDENTIAL

DIG OFL/OQB/OYS/FOH/FBR

(59)

FOR SANDERS FROM CAMERON YOUR 240945Z REFERS PD EMERGENCY BRIDGING EQUIPT FOR RAILWAYS PD

1. HAVE SPOKEN TO MR BRAMWELL OF THOMAS STOREY ENGRS LTD 8 SOUTH WHARF LONDON W2 PD FIRM CAN SUPPLY SUCH BRIDGES AND CLAIM THAT THEY HAVE SOME IN SERVICE IN SOUTH AMERICA PD THEY CAN PROVIDE PHOTOGRAPHS IF REQUIRED PD CAN ALSO SHOW VISITORS SECTIONS OF BRIDGES AT THEIR FACTORY PD
2. BRAMWELL INFORMED ME THAT FIRM HAD ALREADY HAD PASSED TO THEM VIA DORMAN LONG A SIMILAR AND POSSIBLY IDENTICAL REQUEST IN LETTER FORM FROM IRAQI GOVT PD
3. SUGGEST DIRECT APPROACH TO THOMAS STOREY PD
4. HAVE ALSO SPOKEN TO FAIREY ENGINEERING WHO ARE UNABLE TO SUPPLY PD

FILES

DEFENCE DEPT

MED

NENAD

MR THOMSON

MR WEIR

MR CAMPBELL

COPIES TO:

DEPT OF TRADE,
1, VICTORIA STREET

Yes: this should be passed on to the DOT not now - it is not a military sale.

CONFIDENTIAL

20/6

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
28 JUN 1974

No. 428 MBR/10/1

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
27 JUN 1974

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 19
27 JUN 1974

EMBASSY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
21 QUEEN'S GATE,
LONDON, S.W.7.

Enter
W. Haffany.

68

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq presents its compliments to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to inform them of the desire expressed by the Iraqi delegation from the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Defence to visit the United Kingdom and to view quickly installed bridges which compensate for the destroyed or ruined railway bridges, whose spans exceed 40 feet.

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq would be most grateful for any assistance the esteemed Ministry would be able to extend.

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurances of its highest consideration.

1. Chancery Baghdad
2. Mr. Cameron,
MoD Sales 1

3 Dept of Trade 1 Via Voria Street
London, 25th June 1974

Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London.



See reply
at 71

NBR10/1

XY33

REPETITION OF TELEGRAMS

REGISTRY
No.

(Date) 27.6.76
(Despatched) 1721

(1) TELEGRAM EXAMINERS
COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT

Please repeat to the posts shown below attached telegram No. Baghdad 230.

from/to TEHRAN No. 246 Date 27/6

Flash
En Clair
Code
Cypher
Immediate
Priority
Routine

(Signed) S. ON
(Dept.) R. E.
(Date) 27.6.74

(2) DEPARTMENT CONCERNED (for Archives)

(For use in Communications Department)

Security classification 271520 Confidential
Addressed to Routine Tehran telegram No. of
and to

Following telegram now repeated to you at request of Department
was received from Baghdad telegram No. 230 of 25 June
sent to

[Here insert from A to B of attached telegram]

15200
27/6/76



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35

28 JUN 1974

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 28 June 1974

O Ogun Esq
Sales Supply 5b
Ministry of Defence
St Christopher House

1A. (29/6)

Dear Mr. Ogun,

IRAQ: ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT

Thank you for your letter D/Sales/523/10/12 of 11 June.

2. There is no political objection to the supply of 2 Relay Series Type B for Hawker Hunter aircraft to Iraq.

3. I am copying this letter to the other members of the AWP.

Yours sincerely,

Miss M R McIntosh

MISS M R McINTOSH
Defence Department

70

SORRY ABOUT THIS DATE

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
2 JUL 1974
MB R10/1

Sorry HMG's "reaction"
are confidential R. the
O3-5 Company, and they?
Is this an appropriate
message for the DA before?

VVVZCZC DFA034

DSAO-T-PP BE BAGHDAD
-T-RR FCO MED
DE RBDWC 0738 1791953
PRIORITY ROUTINE 281800Z JUN
FM MODUK PE
TO BE BAGHDAD
INFO FCO MED
BT

I will have
thought not
1/7
H. BATTERY

NO DISTRIBUTION

TOP
ADVANCE COPY

Hd/MED

CONFIDENTIAL
DIG EBR

FOR SANDERS DA FROM BRITAIN AD SALES 1B CYMBELINE BROOKS EMI HAS
ASKED FOR FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BE SENT TO GENERAL JENAB THROUGH
YOU

QUOTE EMI MANAGEMENT FIND CONTRACTUAL CONDITIONS WE DISCUSSED LAST
WEEK TO BE SUITABLE BUT HAVE INSTRUCTED ME TO SEEK THE OBSERVATIONS
OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. THIS IS IN HAND AND I WILL SIGNAL
IMMEDIATELY I HAVE OUR GOVERNMENTS REACTIONS UNQUOTE
GRATEFUL YOUR ASSISTANCE
BT

I have pointed out to Mr. Brittain that the content of
this message might have been more generally
represented. He took the point.

NNNN

W.A. 1/7

68

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
2 JUL 1974
NBR10/1

71

IA. L37

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq and has the honour to acknowledge its Note Verbale No 428 of 25 June regarding the proposed visit of an Iraqi delegation to the United Kingdom to view railway emergency bridging equipment.

A similar request has been received by the British Embassy in Baghdad, which is in direct touch with the Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding this matter

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq the assurances of its highest consideration.

1 July 1974

Embassy of the Republic of Iraq
21-22 Queen's Gate
LONDON SW7 5JG



Hidden Copies:

Chancery, Baghdad
Mr Cameron, MOD Sales 1
Dept of Trade

72

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 5 JUL 1974 MB 1210/1
--

0053.

*Mr. Burton 1833/7
pc*

KDFA008
DSAO-T-BRITEMB BAGHDAD
-T-FCO NENAD
-T-ESBOT
DE RBDWC 0803 1832330
PRI 021500Z JUL
FM MODUK
TO BRITEMB BAGHDAD
INFO FCO NENAD
ESBOT

MOD DISTRIBUTION

MEI

C O N F I D E N T I A L
DIG OFL/OQB/OYS/FBH/EBR

FOR SANDERS FROM CAMERON YOUR 291000Z JUN REFERS PD EMERGENCY
BRIDGING EQUIPT FOR RAILWAYS

- 1 PD REGRET ROYAL ENGINEERS DO NOT NOW HAVE ANY SUCH EQUIPMENT
 - 2 PD HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT WHEN REQUIRED RAILWAY BRIDGINE EQUIPT IS
OBTAINED BY MOD FROM DEPT OF ENVIRONMENT
 - 3 PD HAVE SPOKEN TO DTI WHO WILL NOW HANDLE THIS ENQUIRY
- BT

NNNN


Mr Clark *8/4/7*Mr Williams *8/4/7**W. Bowt**W. Rafferty**E.H.A. 8/4/7*

REC'D IN REGISTER NO 35 5 JUL 1974 MBR 10/1
--

BLMC AND THE BOYCOTT

1. Lord Greenhill telephoned me on 1 July as a Director of BLMC to say that they had been told that it would help British Leylands to free themselves of the Arab boycott if they were to supply tank transporters to Iraq and Samaritans to Syria. Lord Greenhill assumed (wrongly as it turns out) that his informant had in fact been referring to the supply of Saracens for Syria. Lord Greenhill asked me what were the prospects of BLMC being allowed to supply either equipment.

2. After consulting Mr Craig I have told Lord Greenhill, for his private information, that Ministers have not yet considered the question of supplies for Syria, but that since Samaritans are designed primarily for ambulance purposes their supply to Syria would certainly not automatically be excluded. On tank transporters for Iraq, I told Lord Greenhill that, as he probably recalled, the question had been considered by Ministers in the last Administration, who had concluded that an export licence for tank transporters to Iraq would have to be refused. I told him that this question again had not been considered by the present Administration, but that my personal assessment ~~was~~ that they would a fortiori be opposed to any such contract.



P R H Wright
Middle East Department

3 July 1974

cc Mr Craig, NENAD

Mr Corley, Department of Trade

~~MSB~~

Mr. W. H. D. M.

GR 90

NO DISTRIBUTION

Σ C C D
T R E D

1A. 218/7

TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD TELNO EXCED 36 OF 1 JULY.

Presumably
nonstrategic
goods
destined for
the Eastern
Bloc.

Mr. Brown
for W. J. Brown

8/7
DOI will take them up direct & will let
us know id.

7/5
taken to.
in me work.

L4/7

Mr. Raftery
Any comments?
RBR 3/7

li Burton.

We will need to watch
this : I shd have thought
we cd say from the
criteria already laid down
whether X is the case.

~~Have copy of ^{TS.} 4/7.
 Miss MACK,
 Export Ministry,
 Room 522
 DOT.~~

Enter.

12 3/4

FCO NR 686/E094/03.

LKS NR 98/3

RR DTI/EXCED

GR 80

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 030730Z

COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE

TO ROUTINE ECGD TEL NO EXCED 32 OF 3 JULY.

YOUR EXCED 36 OF 1 JULY.

FAIREY ENGINEERING.

WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON THIS REQUIREMENT.

HOWEVER IT IS POSSIBLE THAT RUNWAY REQUIRED FOR MOSUL AIRPORT, WHICH HAS BEEN TAKEN OVER BY THE MILITARY AND WHICH HAS GROUND WATER PROBLEMS. ALTHOUGH BUYER IS MINISTRY OF DEFENCE RUNWAY MAY WELL BE USED FOR CIVILIAN PURPOSES. WE CANNOT SEE ANY REASON WHY THIS BUSINESS SHOULD BE PROHIBITED AND HOPE YOU CAN AGREE COVER.

GIDDENS

BT

1500

75

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 8 JUL 1974 MBR10/1
--

ADVANCE COPY

ECG.

TRE.

~~ME.~~

Mr. B...

~~Mr. K...~~

EMPA

6/1/7

sounds very
auto - kind

to me
18/8/77

From: O. Ogun, Sales Supply 5b, Room 1144



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
36319 JUL 1974
MBR10 1
Your reference

76

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
SW1.

Our reference D/Sales/
523/10/12
Date 3 July, 1974

Letter to Mrs McIntosh
MBR10
This is minor equipment. No objection.

Dear Miss McIntosh,

We have received a request for the supply of 128.
25 Pdr. Gun Spares to the Iraqi Army.

May we please have your agreement to fulfil this
order, valued at £780 approx.

*wait another two
weeks.*

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

220 refs

Copy to:

BU 2 weeks

CG 8/7

Letter not

for battery.

Any objections please?

Still pending

BU 2 weeks

MBR

12/8

Head of DS 13
MOD DS 13b
MOD Defence Policy Staff
DTI (EPB)
Treasury (Defence Materiel Dept.)
Sales 1b

These held pending a submission Defence Dept 17

in arms sales to Iraq in general.

MBR 24/7
OPD consideration expected next week 4/8/77
by again
10/8/77

CONFIDENTIAL



British Embassy
Tehran

Encl 15/7

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35	
15 JUL 1974	
NBR10	1
Your reference NBR 10/2	

77

P A Raftery Esq
MED
FCO

Your reference ~~NBR 10/2~~

Our reference 10/2

Date 3 July 1974

Dear Peter,

ARMS SALE TO IRAQ

1. Thank you for your letter of 17 June (not to Baghdad). You will no doubt have seen our telegram No. 324 of 23 June. Despite the considerations in this telegram, we can see no reason why the Iranians should object to the sale to the Iraqis of the items you mention. We should, therefore, be happy if the sale were to go ahead.

(S1) / artillery ammunition equipment

(S7)

Yours sincerely
Nick Browne

N W Browne

cc Chancery
Baghdad

S. 16/7.
Make copy of comp to Mr. Fayle, MODSIB

15/7.
1A. 18/7 —

CONFIDENTIAL




MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation Sales 1B

Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ

Telex 23605



Telephone 01 437 9282 ext.

Direct Line 01 632 4708

Switchboard 01 632 3333

Miss M McIntosh
Defence Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London SW1

Your reference

Our reference D/Sales/113/18/1
D/Sales/113/73/2

Date

11th July 1974

Dear Miss McIntosh

ARMS WORKING PARTY CLEARANCES

Could we have an indication of your Department's view to the release of the equipment described below please?

- 1 Country. Iraq.
- 2 Description of weapons system. HS 1182 (Hawk). This aircraft is designed for the training of pilots in jet flying and navigational and weapons procedures and can be used for basic and advanced jet flying training.
- 3 Security classification of equipment. Unclassified.
- 4 Value of sale. The aircraft are approximately £800,000 each and the Iraqis require within the region of 30.
- 5 Further information:- The aircraft is made by Hawker Siddeley.

I am copying this letter to other members of the AWP.

Yours sincerely

Christine Lamb.

noted &
1 August.

E.M.A. 119

Copies to:- Mr H R Braden - DS13
Mr M Esau - DS13
Mr W P Cassell - Treasury
Mr P T Durnell - DTI (EPB)
Lt Col C W A Napier - DPS (C team)

Butterfield
Her Registry.

78

for your comments in due
course please

Christine Lamb
Defence Dept 16/7

Mr. Lamb -
Mr. Thank you for
Sales to Iraq and about
to be submitted to D

11/7

Confidential
Reference.....
Mr. Rafferty Good.

MR-1)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY N 35 18 JUL 1974 MBR10/1
--

79

Symboline for Iraq.

I have now heard from the Secretary of the Release of Military Information & Equipment Sub Committee that the MOD members are prepared to release this equipment to Iraq in the last quarter of 1976 i.e. 18 months after its in-service date with the British Army.

2. Defense Intelligence had discounted the likelihood that the equipment would find its way to the Khafar rebels as remote.

3. I understand that MOS (Sales) has made the point which MOD may well follow up in a further letter to us, that we should sound out the Arab before entering into any commitment to supply Iraq.

17. 7. 74.

MRM Gosh.
Defense Dept.

LA. R 1/7

W. Raftery
E.M.A. 8.18.74
18/17
20

EXPORT CREDITS GUARANTEE DEPARTMENT

PO BOX NO 272, ALDERMANBURY HOUSE, ALDERMANBURY, LONDON EC2P 2EL

Fax: 863601

Telephone: 01-606 6699

1. Pich Rd
J. H. Treasury
Great George Street
London
W1P 3AG

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 43


17 JUL 1974

MTM3/359/1

Your reference

Our reference
SP/A/36190/8146

Date
17 July 1974



Dear

IRAQ - CYMBELINE RADARS

We have been approached by EMI Electronics Ltd for cover on a sale of 12 Cymbeline radars to the Iraqis. Contract value is £3.745m. Delivery will be 12 - 21 months. Terms proposed are 40% with order, and the balance CAD/ILC.

We shall be grateful to have your authority to cover this business under Section 2 provided of course a licence is obtained.

Yours sincerely

D H Jeffery

cc	G M Lambert	-	Bank of England
	T J Wilshire	-	ODM
	S N Chilton	-	DOT
	E R C Holland	-	FCO
	R J Sanders	-	MOD
	J V Coggins	-	ECOD
	A A Sapsted	-	

Copy sent to G.S. Burton (MOD) WAZ

SR
R/L



From: W L Wood, Sales Supply 5b, Room 1144

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext 3631

81

1. MKD 5 entw

2. Mr. Koptany

I have lost Sales Supply that this will have to wait until the Ministry of Defence has a general first

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
London, SW1.

Your reference



Good. what the
in the month 18/7.

Our reference

D/Sales/523/10/12

Date

16 July, 1974.



Dear Miss M^cIntosh,

AIRFIELD LANDING MAT - IRAQ

1. The British Aluminium Company Ltd. (BACO) of Redditch, Worcestershire, have commercial exploitation rights in the above matting, known officially as "extruded aluminium panels for the surfacing of airfields", or PSA (Prefabricated Surfacing Aluminium).

2. The mat is comprised of 3 lb and 4 lb panels. The 3 lb panels were designed by the Military Vehicles and Engineering Establishment, Christchurch, and have been taken into official Service use for the following roles:

- a. Medium Range Transport (MRT) Runways
- b. Forward Operating Pads for VTOL Aircraft
- c. Engine Test Pads

The 3 lb version can accommodate single wheel weights of 30,000 lbs. with tyre pressures 80-100 psi and a California Bearing Rate (CBR) of 6%.

3. There is no specific Service requirement at present for a 4 lb panel. However, as a sales venture with MOD concurrence BACO using basic MVEE(c) design information made a panel to take single wheel weights of 20,000 lbs. with tyre pressures of up to 215 psi and a CBR of 8% which was given simulated tests by MVEE(c). The 4 lb panel can be used to reinforce the 3 lb version which is prone to damage when used on soft ground, thus extending its useful life. It should also be able to take light aircraft and fighters.

4. It is the intention that Fairey Engineering Ltd. (FEL) of Stockport, Cheshire, will act as agents for BACO in the supply to the Iraq MOD of two runways each of three kilometres length made up of two-thirds 3 lb panel and one-third (the centre strip) of 4 lb panel. The mats would therefore appear to be caught under Group 1 of the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1970:

"Appliances for use with arms and apparatus specially designed and intended for land, sea or aerial warfare"

May political and other clearances as might be necessary be given for this proposed sale please which is likely to be in the region of a £3M order.

..... 5. FEL/

From: W L Wood, Sales Supply 5b, Room 1144



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext

Your reference

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
London, SW1

Our reference D/Sales/523/10/12

Date

5. FEL have asked for a very early reply if possible please.

*Yours sincerely,
Les Wood.*

Copy to:

Head of DS 13
MOD DS 13b
MOD Defence Policy Staff
DTI (EPB)
Treasury (Defence Materiel Dept)
Sales Supply 5a
Sales 1b

82

EXPORT CREDITS GUARANTEE DEPARTMENT


BOX NO. 272, ALDERMANBURY HOUSE, ALDERMANBURY, LONDON EC2P 2EL

Telex : 881601

Telephone : 01-606 6699



I E Rich Esq
HM Treasury
Great George Street
LONDON
SW1P 3AG



Your reference

Our reference

SP/A/44401/8167

Date

15 July 1974

Dear

MOBILE RUNWAY - IRAQ - FAIREY ENGINEERING

We have been approached by Fairey Engineering for cover on a supplier credit basis on the sale of a Mobile Runway to the Ministry of Defence Iraq. The Runway consists of aluminium planks, and the contract value is £3m. Terms proposed are 20% with order 80% CAD/CHC. Delivery is expected to take place over 6 to 26 months from date of contract.

We shall be grateful for your approval to take this business under Section 2.

Yours sincerely

D M Jaffray



cc G M Lambert - Bank of England
T J Wilshire - CDM
S N Chilton - DoT
E R C Holland - FCO
R J Sanders - MOD
J W Coggins) ECGD
A A Sapsted)

Copy sent to QS Burton (MED)

JR 16/7

li Jaffray. - Is this alright
in terms of the OPD
paper.
~~li Holland (FREN)~~

What do you think? No MED objection?
JR 22/7

Discussed with Mr Williams and agreed to allow this to proceed
since it did not indicate approval to the Saker in any way. R.M.I. Rm/pe
Munich that the matter is up for consideration by Ministers.

R.H.A. 18/7



Treasury Chambers
Great George Street London SW1P 3AG

Telex 262405

Telephone 01-930 1234 ext

FILED IN
RECORD Y No. 43

22 JUL 1974


(83)

D M Jaffray Esq
Export Credits Guarantee Department
Aldermanbury House
Aldermanbury
London
EC2P 2EL

Your reference
SP/A/44401/8167

Our reference
2F(E) 17-180-01

Date
19 July 1974



E MA 1247-

(82)
MOBILE RUNWAY - IRAQ

Your letter of 15 July notified Departments of the request from Fairey Engineering for supplier credit cover for the sale of a mobile runway to the Iraqi Ministry of Defence.

I confirm that the Treasury has no objections to the proposed sale and that this business may be notated to the Section 2 arms account.

A SCOTT


Mr. Burton (ME).

cc
G M Lambert B/E
T J Wilshire ODM
S N Chilton DOT
E R C Holland FCO
R J Sanders MOD

Secretary of State (84)

NBR 10/1

CONFIDENTIAL



Mr Weir ✓
Mr Acland
cfr in cres ✓

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

- 1 In his minute of 12 July to the Secretary of State, Mr Acland mentioned that the general question of arms sales to Iraq would be referred shortly to the DOP Committee.
- 2 I now submit a draft paper which it is hoped will be taken by the DOP Committee at their next meeting on Thursday, 26 July. NENAD are submitting a separate paper on sales to Syria.
- 3 We have considered with NENAD whether it would be better to amalgamate these two subjects into one paper. In view, however, of the different considerations (eg: Iran, Kuwait and the Kurds) which apply in the case of Iraq and since Iraq has not previously been discussed by Ministers in this context, I think it is right to treat the two questions separately.

P R H Wright
Middle East Department

19 July 1974

cc: NENAD
Defence Department

I agree with the draft, which
embodies the right degree of caution.
I think

Mr Weir
19/7

CONFIDENTIAL

This seems alright but

I'm unclear what "consulting" the
Sounding
out. Shah means!

No. Do we ask him to agree?

or If he expresses doubt, do we

Possibly.
Depending
on the strength of reaction
refuse?

And why do we ask him?

And what would be the result if
we didn't?


Because he would get
to hear & would react
v. badly if we didn't.
Our relations with the
Shah are infinitely more
important than with Iraq



I have talked to Mr Wright. It is really
a question of sounding out the Shah and
getting a reaction to enable us to make a
decision. The draft has been amended. ~~NOT~~ 23/7

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SECRETARY OF STATE



Defence Sales to Iraq

Mr Rafferty (NFO)
hsh.

Agree

26/7

184

On the draft DOP paper you commented:-

"This seems all right but (a) I am not sure what 'consulting the Shah' means; (b) Do we ask him to agree; (c) If he expresses doubts do we refuse?; (d) Why do we ask him and (e) What would be the result if we did not?".

2. I have talked to Mr. Wright (Middle East Department).

The answers are:-

- (a) It means sounding out;
- (b) No
- (c) Possibly - depending on the strength of his reaction;
- (d)&(e) Because the Shah would get to hear of it and it takes very little to awaken his suspicions of what we are up to in Iraq. He would react very badly if he did not know in advance. Our interests in Iran and therefore our relations with the Shah are infinitely more important to us than Iraq

/It is

CONFIDENTIAL

3. It is thus a question of sounding out the Shah and getting a reaction to enable us to make a final decision. The draft has been amended in this sense.

4. *Time is so short that we might have to try to deal with this out of committee. Do you mind?*

A handwritten signature consisting of several overlapping loops, possibly reading 'M. M. M.', with a horizontal line drawn through the middle of the loops.

24 July, 1974

87

REC 1	DIK
REC 1	NO 35
25 JUL 1974	
NBR 10/1	

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TOP COPY

1A. L 9/8

GRS 30

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 270920Z JULY.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

DESKBY 290800Z JULY.

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 265 OF 27 JULY 1974.

OUR TELEGRAM NO 215 : ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. AS I EXPECT TO BE QUESTIONED ABOUT THIS VERY SHORTLY,
I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

GIDDENS

FILES

MED
DEFENCE DEPT
MR WEIR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(88)

IMMEDIATE

DESKBY 301600Z

CYPHER/CAT-A-

FM FCO 291140Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 301600Z

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 31 JUL 1974 MBR 10/1
--

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LA. 1918.

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO 173 OF 29/7/74.

(87)

YRTELNO. 265: ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, POLICY IS AT PRESENT BEING CONSIDERED BY MINISTERS. WE HOPE FOR A DECISION NOT LATER THAN 2 AUGUST.

2. YOU SHOULD, IF THE SUBJECT CANNOT BE AVOIDED, TAKE THE LINE THAT YOU AWAIT INSTRUCTIONS.

CALLAGHAN

FILES
MED
DEFENCE DEPT
MR WEIR
MR CAMPBELL

CONFIDENTIAL

NKND

a 1659



10 Downing Street
Whitehall

30 July, 1974



Dear Richard,

Defence Sales to Syria and Iraq

I write to inform you that the Prime Minister has studied the two memoranda circulated to the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary (OPD)(74) 26 and 27): and that Mr. Wilson is in agreement with the recommendations made, subject to any views of his colleagues on the Committee.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries of Ministers represented on the Committee and to Brearley (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc

Tom Bridges

R.N. Dales, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

(125) refs

Mr. Clark 1/17
Mr. Raftery 1/18
Euler
1/18

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER/CAT A

FM FCO 051820Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 060400Z

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REGISTRY No. 35

- 6 AUG 1974

NBR 10/1

(NBR 10/1)

TOP COPY

TO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN TELNO 322 OF 5 AUGUST 1974 INFO KUWAIT,
BAGHDAD, JEDDA.

YOUR TELNO 324: ARMS SALES TO IRAQ

1. MINISTERS HAVE AGREED THAT YOU SHOULD TEST THE SHAH'S REACTIONS ABOUT CYMBELINE AND THE HAWK TRAINER/LIGHT GROUND ATTACK AIRCRAFT BEFORE ANY FINAL DECISION ON THE SALE OF EITHER EQUIPMENT IS TAKEN. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, THEIR INCLINATION IS TO REFUSE AN EXPORT LICENCE FOR CYMBELINE BECAUSE ALTHOUGH BASICALLY A DEFENSIVE AID IT COULD BE OF SIGNIFICANT USE AGAINST THE KURDS; MOREOVER THE IRANIANS THEMSELVES ARE INTERESTED IN BUYING IT. ON THE OTHER HAND, CYMBELINE WAS DEVELOPED AS A COLLABORATIVE VENTURE BETWEEN HMG AND INDUSTRY AND THERE IS AN OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT THE MANUFACTURER IN EXPORT SALES. ON HAWK, WHILE THERE ARE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE NUMBERS INVOLVED, IT IS NOT THOUGHT LIKELY THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD CONVERT THE TRAINER VERSION INTO A LIGHT GROUND ROLE WHEN THEY ALREADY POSSESS RUSSIAN HIGH-PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT FOR THIS PURPOSE AND IF THE IRANIANS DO NOT RAISE OBJECTIONS, THEY WOULD BE INCLINED TO AGREE TO SUPPLY.

2. WHEN YOU NEXT SEE THE SHAH THEREFORE (POSSIBLY WHEN ACCOMPANYING SIR L SUFFIELD), YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE ARE AT THE MOMENT CONSIDERING AN IRAQI REQUEST FOR 12 CYMBELINE MORTAR LOCATING RADARS AND 30 HAWK AIRCRAFT. GIVEN THE IRAQIS' RECORD, HMG INTEND TO MAINTAIN A VERY RESTRICTIVE POLICY ON THE PROVISION OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO THEM, LIMITING SUPPLIES TO RELATIVELY MINOR ITEMS, THE EQUIPMENT UNDER CONSIDERATION IS RELATIVELY MINOR IN A MILITARY

/SENSE BUT

CONFIDENTIAL

101 refs

CONFIDENTIAL

SENSE BUT NONETHELESS WE HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT ALLOWING EITHER SALE. THE CYMBELINE RADAR COULD BE OF SIGNIFICANT USE AGAINST THE KURDS. ON HAWK, THIRTY AIRCRAFT IS A SIZEABLE NUMBER AND THE EXPORT VERSION HAS A LIGHT GROUND ATTACK CAPABILITY, THOUGH IT IS SUBSIC AND PRIMARILY DESIGNED AS A TRAINER AIRCRAFT. MOREOVER DELIVERY WOULD NOT COMMENCE FOR OVER TWO YEARS. BEFORE TAKING A FIRM DECISION ON EITHER SALE WE SHOULD LIKE TO KNOW THE SHAH'S VIEWS.

CALLAGHAN

F I L E S

MED
DEFENCE D
MR WEIR
MR CAMPBELL

COPIES TO:

DS 13 M O D
MOD SALES \

NENAD

91

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

SECRET

MO 26/9/5

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

DEFENCE SALES TO SYRIA AND IRAQ

OPD(74)26 AND OPD(74)27

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35

8 AUG 1974

MBR10 | 1

I am in broad agreement with what you propose in your OPD papers on defence sales to Syria and Iraq. I do however have the following comments.

2. Once our OPD colleagues have endorsed your proposals in principle I will arrange for the detailed examination of the specific items proposed for sale in order to ensure that there are no operational or security problems in the case of Syria. I can say now that there would be no such objections to the supply of Cymbeline or armoured ambulances.

3. Since, of the items which the UAE is prepared to fund on behalf of Syria (OPS(74)26: Annex 'A'), only the armoured ambulances can be approved, considerable care will need to be taken in conveying the decision if we are not to give offence to the UAE. Our Ambassador to the UAE might perhaps present the decision as a package with the implication that the UAE might wish to assist in the purchase of those items which we are able to supply.

4. While fully supporting the need to consult the Shah on sales to Iraq, I doubt the wisdom of 'informing' the Kuwaitis of our intentions. Negotiations for the supply of 36 Jaguar aircraft to Kuwait are about to commence to be followed soon after by negotiations for the supply of Chieftain tanks. We should therefore perhaps not gratuitously invite their strictures and possibly arouse their suspicions, quite unintentionally, by our openness. Should they raise the matter we can assure them that only innocuous items are being supplied.

5. As suggested in paragraph 8 of OPD(74)27, the Hawk, in its export version, is fitted for use as a light strike aircraft. I agree that there is no reason for Iraq to buy it specifically for use in this role since they already have adequate capability in the shape of Russian strike/ground attack aircraft, although it would represent an increased capability. I agree that in this respect we should be guided by the reaction of the Iranians. I would only add that once approval in principle is given to the supply of this aircraft it will be necessary for me to arrange for the detailed examination of the specification and delivery times being offered, to confirm that these do not conflict with RAF requirements.

/6.

SECRET

SECRET

102
104



SECRET

6. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister and the members of the OPD, and Sir John Hunt.

R.M.

31st July, 1974.

SECRET

SECRET



COPY No.1

92

Secretary of State for Industry
1 Victoria Street
London SW1H 0ET

01-222 7877

RECEIVED IN REGISTER. NO. 35 - 8 AUG 1974 MB 210/1

2 August 1974

Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Whitehall
London SW1

Am Jim:

DEFENCE SALES TO SYRIA AND IRAQ: OPD(74)24 AND OPD(74)27

I am generally content that you should act as you propose in your papers. At the moment, however, the Syrians are very close to deciding on the purchase of wide-bodied aircraft. We have been emphasising our interest in the Tristar, and it is clear that the decision is very finely balanced. It would be most unfortunate if we took any action which was liable to tip the balance against us. I would therefore ask that you should not allow our decisions on defence sales to become known until the Syrians have decided one way or the other on the Tristar.

Tomy

A W BENN

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93

GRS 150

CYPHER CAT A

FM KUWAIT 070630Z AUG

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TOP COPY

3-1A

27/8

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 475 OF 7 AUGUST¹⁹⁷⁴/RFI TO ROUTINE TEHRAN,
BAGHDAD AND JEDDA.

YRTELNO 322 TO TEHRAN: ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. ALTHOUGH I DO NOT THINK THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSULT THE
KUWAITIS ABOUT THE IRAQIS' REQUEST FOR CYMBELINE AND HAWK
WE SHOULD INFORM THEM OF OUR DECISION (AND ESPECIALLY IF WE
AGREE TO SUPPLY THESE ITEMS) BEFORE THERE IS ANY DANGER OF THE NEWS
BECOMING PUBLIC. AS YOU KNOW THE KUWAITIS ARE OBSESSED WITH ALL
THINGS IRAQI AND INSTINCTIVELY SUSPICIOUS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH
BAGHDAD. IT IS IN OUR INTERESTS TO KEEP THEM INFORMED OF DEVELOPEMENTS
THERE. ✓✓✓

2. IF WE DECIDE TO REFUSE EXPORT LICENCES, WE SHOULD ALSO LET THE
KUWAITIS KNOW, EXPLAINING OUR DECISION ON THE LINES OF THE
SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 2 OF YOU TUR. THEY WOULD WELCOME OUR
FRANKNESS AND THE IMPLICATION THAT BY REFUSING TO SUPPLY A PLANE
WITH A GROUND ATTACK CAPABILITY WE HAD THEIR INTERESTS IN
MIND COULD EARN US CONSIDERABLE CREDIT.

it would
only be
by a plane

27/8

LAMB

FILES

MED
DEFENCE DEPT
MR WEIR
MR CAMPBELL

COPIES TO:

DS13, MOD
MOD SALES

CONFIDENTIAL

From: H R Braden, Head of DS 13

, Room 0203,

end A. 27/8

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--

SECRET

Mr. Kaftery

94

27/8

J E Jackson Esq
Defence Department
Room MS 17
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Downing Street (East)
London SW1A 2AL

XXXXXXXXXX D/DS 13/174
D/DS 13/178
D/DS 13/709/19
D/DS 13/709/62

2 August 1974

DEFENCE SALES TO SYRIA AND IRAQ:
OPD(74)26 AND OPD(74)27

(91)

You will have seen my Secretary of State's letter of 31 July agreeing with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's proposals in the above two papers. I understand the Prime Minister has also agreed.

2. There are two points I should make in amplification of the broad Ministry of Defence agreement; these are:

a. Since many of the items which have been agreed for supply are under generic descriptions it would be unwise to announce to the Syrians or the Iranians that these will be supplied since it will be necessary to go through the normal AWP or RMIPC procedures to obtain the necessary MOD clearances for the specific items which it is proposed to supply. This point has of course already been brought to the attention of your department by DS 13b in a minute dated 31 July.

b. With regard to the supply of Cymbeline, both to Iraq and to Syria, I should make it plain that agreement to supply is conditional upon the actual date of delivery being acceptable to the British Army from a security point of view.

3. I am copying this letter to Ian McDonald (D Sales 1), Alex Stirling (Head of DIS(CS)), Brigadier Desmond Rice (BGS(MO)), Patrick Wright (MED) and James Craig (NENAD).

H. R. BRADEN

SECRET

FO 749/ E 65/8

95

LLC NR 399/8

PP FCO

RR KUWAIT

RR BAGHDAD

RR JEDDA

GR 158

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He MEIS

ADVANCE COPY
[Files]

CYPHER CAT A

FM TEHRAN 080915Z AUG

SECRET

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 428 OF 8 AUG RPTD FOR INFO TO KUWAIT
BAGHDAD AND JEDDA,

FOLLOWING FROM ELLINGWORTH IN HM AMBASSADOR'S ABSENCE ON
LOCAL LEAVE,

YOUR TEL NO 322 : ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

Telegram sent
5-11A
N. Raftery
For advice on
8/1/74
3

2-8/8

THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

1. SIR LESTER SUFFIELD AND HIS COLLEAGUES WILL BE SEEING THE SHAH TOMORROW ON ANOTHER MATTER, BUT I SHALL NOT BE ACCOMPANYING THEM. IN ANY CASE, IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE THE SHAH ATTACHES TO IRAN-IRAQ RELATIONS, HM AMBASSADOR WOULD CERTAINLY WISH TO BROACH THIS DELICATE MATTER WITH THE SHAH HIMSELF. SUFFIELD FULLY ACCEPTS THIS.

2.

THE SHAH MAY IN FACT BE LESS OPPOSED TO WESTERN OIL SALES TO IRAQ THAN WE HAD THOUGHT. HM AMBASSADOR'S VIEW WAS THAT WE MUST OBTAIN DIRECT CONFIRMATION FROM THE SHAH HIMSELF THAT THIS IS HIS POSITION.

3. IN VIEW OF THE SHAH'S ABSENCE ON THE CASPIAN, IT MAY BE SOME TIME BEFORE AN AUDIENCE CAN BE ARRANGE.

GRATEFUL TO LEARN DATE BY WHICH DECISIONS MUST BE MADE IN LONDON.

PARSONS

CCN PARA 3. CAN BE ARRANGED.

NNNN

THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

LKS NR 412/8

RR MODUK ARMY

GR 60

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 080930Z

CONFIDENTIAL

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discussed with the Clark & the
Williams & agreed that this does
not radically alter the situation and
that our telegram to Tehran of 8 August
covered the situation. *McHaffery*
This adds urgency

E.H.A. 19/8 to a decision
MOD DISTRIBUTION *1/8*

Med

TO ROUTINE MODUK ARMY TEL NO DIG EBR OF 8 AUGUST.

FOR MDS 1 B FROM LEE: CYMBELINE.

1. I HAVE RECEIVED LETTER FROM DIRECTOR OF ARMAMENT AND
SUPPLY, CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFFS OFFICE, ASKING FOR URGENT
INFORMATION PRESENT SITUATION RE SUPPLY OF CYMBELINE.
IN CONSULTATION WITH CHANCERY, I HAVE REPLIED THAT MATTER
IS STILL UNDER STUDY IN LONDON.

GIDDENS

BT


NNNN

GPS 50
Priority

CYPHER/CAT A

FM F C O 081725Z

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY TEHRAN TELNO 331 OF 8 AUGUST 1974, INFO
KUWAIT BAGHDAD JEDDA. (95)

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 420: ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. WE AGREE WITH YOU PARAGRAPH 1.
2. THERE IS NO DEADLINE HERE BUT AS E M I ARE PRESSING M O D
SALES FOR AN ANSWER ON CYMBELINE A FORECAST OF THE
POSSIBLE DATE FOR AN AUDIENCE WOULD BE HELPFUL ..
TO US AND BAGHDAD.

CALLAGHAN.

FILES
MED.
DEFENCE O

COPIES TO
DS 13
SALES 13 } MOD.

CONFIDENTIAL

(101) refs



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

98

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35

15 AUG 1974

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 13 August 1974

O OGUN ES/Q
SALES SUPPLY 5b
DEFENCE SALES ORGANISATION
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ST CHRISTOPHER HOUSE

L.A. 15/8

Dear Mr. Ogun,
IRAQ: GUN SPARES

1. Thank you for your letter D/Sales/523/10/12 of 3 July 1974.
2. There is no political objection to the supply of 25 Pounder Gun Spares to Iraq.
3. I am copying this letter to the other members of the Arms Working Party.

Yours sincerely,

Minna McIntosh

**Miss M R McIntosh
Defence Department**



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation Sales 1b

Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ

Telex 23605

Telephone ~~01 437 9282 ext.~~

Direct Line 01 632 4709

Switchboard 01 632 3333

Miss M McIntosh
Defence Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London SW1

Your reference

Our reference

D/Sales/113/18/1

Date

12th August 1974

Dear Miss McIntosh

ARMS WORKING PARTY CLEARANCES

May we please have an indication of your Department's view to the release of the equipment described below?

- | | | |
|---|-------------------------|--|
| 1 | Country | Iraq |
| 2 | Description | LYNX helicopters - troop carrying version |
| 3 | Security Classification | Unclassified |
| 4 | Value of sale | 40 at £450,000 each with spares at least £20 million. |
| 5 | Further information | The helicopter is made by Westlands but is part of an Anglo-French project. (i.e. French agreement to an export sale is required). |

I am copying this letter to other members of the AWP.

Yours sincerely

H. Cameron

*Butler Raftern
on 3/9/74*

Copies to: Mr H R Braden
Mr M Esau
Mr W P Cassell
Mr P T Durnell
Lt Col C W A Napier

9/8 - DS13
- DS13
- Treasury
- DTI (EPB)
- DPS(C Team)

1. MOD to enter
2. Mr. Raftery
Qualifies for your
comments in due
course.

Miss McIntosh I have asked MOD Sales in the first instance for a professional assessment as to whether this aircraft can be regarded as minor equipment.

If so, we will probably have to submit because of the numbers involved. Meanwhile, would you please kind our the delivery prospects for

*Chickin's
13.8.74.*

Speaks Hugh Cameron

(99)

NBR10/1

*Assessed with Miss Lane, Sales!
She will provide the information
with a*

*Mukh
9/8*

CONFIDENTIAL



27 AUG 1974

NBR10/1

✓ 100
Sir G. Arthur / Def. Dept
Mr Campbell / MED
NENAD

Def. Dept to enter

MED to enter

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

E.H.A. 8/21/8

A A Acland Esq
PS/Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs
Downing Street
SW1A 2AL

16 August 1974

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Dear Acland,

DEFENCE SALES TO SYRIA AND IRAQ
OPD(74) 26 AND 27

I am writing to you on behalf of the Paymaster General to say that we have no objections to the proposals in these papers.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries of the other Ministers represented on the Committee, and to Chris Brearley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

John Beastall

J S BEASTALL

CONFIDENTIAL

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet Documents

Folio No.	Reference	Date
86	OPD(74) 27 (plus Draft)	26/7/1974

The above-listed Cabinet document(s), which was/were enclosed on this file, has/have been removed and destroyed.

For complete series of Cabinet documents see CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed

G. V. Wightman

Date

22/1/04

Arms Working Party Clearances - Sale Of Military Equipment To Iraq And Syria; French Arms Supplies To Iraq. UK Arms Sales To Iraq. 31 Dec. 1973. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 8/2321. Newspaper Cutting. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107472853/GDSC?u=uagm&sid=GDSC&xid=40da25be&pg=1. Accessed 7 Apr. 2021.